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PATRICK N. MALCOLMSON

NIETZSCHE AND THE PROBLEM OF HISTORICISM: A COMMENTARY ON:
The Use and Disadvantage of "Historie" for Life

MASTER OF ARTS

1984

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

NIETZSCHE AND THE PROBLEM OF HISTORICISM

A COMMENTARY ON:

THE USE AND DISADVANTAGE OF "HISTORIE" FOR LIFE

by



PATRICK N. MALCOLMSON

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1984

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

WILSON AND HIS PAPER ON HISTORICAL

A COMMENTARY ON

THE USE AND ABUSE OF THE HISTORICAL

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and
recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for
acceptance, a thesis entitled
.."Nietzsche and the Problem of Historicism".....
.....
submitted by Patrick Malcolmson
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

To Sylvia

THESIS ABSTRACT

The crisis of the West can be described in one word: nihilism. One rightly turns to the political philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche to understand this crisis. Nietzsche argues that the core of the modern crisis is the problem of historicism. He presents this argument at length in his essay The Use and Disadvantage of Historie for Life. My thesis takes the form of a commentary on Nietzsche's essay. It attempts to show why the reader must take seriously Nietzsche's solution to the problem of historicism--the return to the Greeks.

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I. NIETZSCHE AND THE PROBLEM OF HISTORICISM

"For some time now, our whole European culture has been moving as toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade: restlessly, violently, headlong like a river that wants to reach the end, that no longer reflects, that is afraid to reflect."¹ This is the description given to the historical direction of our age by the political philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. We live in a time that, under Nietzsche's influence, has come to be known as the "decline of the West." This decline is the great crisis that faces modernity and hence all modern political philosophy. Nietzsche diagnosed this crisis: the tradition based on reason has lost faith in reason's ability to speak about the most important human things. He described this as nihilism. "What does nihilism mean? ... The aim is lacking; 'Why?' finds no answer."² Nietzsche traced the roots of nihilism back to a decisive moment in the history of Western philosophy: Socrates. But he located the immediate cause of our decline in what he called the "historical disease." To think Nietzsche's thoughts about the modern crisis one would have to discern his understanding of the connection between Socratic philosophy and the rise of historicism or "the historical disease." We shall make a beginning by examining Nietzsche's attack on historicism.

Nietzsche's philosophy can be accurately described as a life-long attempt to overcome historicism. The political dimension of this attempt is Nietzsche's attack on democracy, both liberal and socialist. Nihilism brings about the degeneration of man. The politics that accompanies this degeneration is the politics of socialism. It breeds what Nietzsche called the "last man." For the "last man", human is not a goal but an excuse. Shame is something he has overcome. He has "discovered" happiness in the form of shameless contentment.

To begin to think Nietzsche's political thought, one must begin by considering his attack on historicism in connection with his attack on democracy. Nietzsche agreed with Socrates that the best regime is an aristocracy. But where Socrates suggests that the democratic regime might be valued because in it philosophy can survive, Nietzsche attacks democracy because it has come to mean the destruction of philosophy. The nihilism brought about by historicism makes impossible the cultivation of the highest human type--the philosopher. Nietzsche held that aristocracy is the only regime which could make possible the overcoming of nihilism and its consequent destruction of philosophy. One is tempted to say that because authentic philosophy can no longer persist within modern democracy, Nietzsche embraces the only other alternative--the rule of philosophy.

Nietzsche's influence on our century has been overwhelming. One need only mention Weber, Heidegger, and Spengler to see the truth of this. Nietzsche also made possible the rise of that "amorphous non-school of philosophy" called existentialism, without which there could be no New Left. The political forms of existentialism have been diverse. One cannot forget Heidegger's sympathy for National Socialism, although he was never as sympathetic as Sartre was to Stalinism, which is to say communism. Nietzsche's political influence alone would justify the study of his political philosophy. But there is a justification that goes beyond a historical explanation of modern political thought. One ought to study Nietzsche because he best understood the peculiar nature of the modern crisis. "Nietzsche," says Heidegger, "knew what philosophy is. Such knowledge is rare. Only great thinkers possess it." ³ This reason points to the difference between intellectual history and political philosophy. We are interested in Nietzsche not because of his apparent influence but because we think that Nietzsche understood the truth about the most important political questions. Popularity is not a measure of the profundity of a thinker. Indeed, it most often seems to indicate the opposite.

Where then does one begin with the aim of thinking Nietzsche's thoughts the way he thought them, of understanding Nietzsche the way he understood himself? Nietzsche was born in 1844 and was a professor of

philology at the University of Basel from 1869 to 1879. He suffered a complete mental collapse in 1889 and died in 1900. In the years from 1871 to 1889 he completed thirteen books and oversaw the publication of most of them. Nietzsche wrote his books in a number of different styles. His early works were essays. Upon resigning his professorship, Nietzsche adopted the aphorism as his mode of writing. His later works are a combination of the aphoristic style and the essay form. Thus Spoke Zarathustra is a philosophic drama that practically defies definition. While it is not a dialogue, one cannot help but be reminded of Plato's dramatic artistry. It is most prudent to begin to study Nietzsche's political philosophy with those works which are most conventional with regard to form and hence most understandable. For this reason one turns to Nietzsche's essays The Birth of Tragedy and The Untimely Considerations.

The Birth of Tragedy, published in 1872, is an exceedingly complex account of how Socratic philosophy caused the decline of Hellenic culture. It is the first open attack on Socrates by another philosopher in the Western tradition. Nietzsche's second book, The Untimely Considerations, is a series of essays that were published separately from 1873 to 1876. Nietzsche originally intended to write thirteen of these essays but finished only four. They focus on specific cultural problems of our age. They serve to bring the problem of Socrates

closer to us by showing how our age, like Socrates', is decadent. Nietzsche makes a compelling case for his view that our age suffers from a malignant cultural disease. "Nietzsche never repudiated but only deepened his view of our age as sick and critical."⁴ One is thus justified in beginning an exposition of Nietzsche's political philosophy with an examination of The Untimely Considerations.

"My writings speak only of my overcomings...; they always speak of a 'behind me': some even, like the first three Untimely Considerations, belong back before the experience and period of creation of a previously published book (The Birth of Tragedy)."⁵ Nietzsche thus indicates that the Untimely Considerations are the proper starting point for a study of his political philosophy. This is where we will begin our inquiry.

We shall begin with an examination of the second Untimely Consideration called The Use and Disadvantage of 'Historie' for Life. It is the most untimely of the four essays. This means that it is the most theoretical of the four. It deals with the profound challenge posed by historicism to philosophy. Historicism calls the very possibility of philosophy, as it has been hitherto understood, into question. The essay is untimely because it deals with a question which faces men at all times and one which has occupied the greatest minds of all ages--the question of whether unaided human reason can tell us what is the good life. In other words, is political

philosophy possible?

Nietzsche sent a copy of the second Untimely Consideration to his friend and colleague, Jacob Burckhardt. Burckhardt, in a letter to Nietzsche, praised the essay as "powerful and weighty." He said he thought that Nietzsche had uncovered a tragic incongruity that exists in our age.

This time you will interest numerous readers because this book puts a really tragic incongruity right before our eyes: the antagonism between historical knowledge and the capacity to do or to be, and then again the antagonism between the enormous heaping-up of knowledge acquired, and the materialistic motives of the age. 6

Nietzsche himself describes the essay as follows in his "autobiography", Ecce Homo:

The second Untimely One (1874) brings to light what is dangerous and gnaws at and poisons life in our kind of traffic with science and scholarship (Wissenschaft)--how life is made sick by this dehumanized and mechanical grinding of gears, the "impersonality" of the labourer, the false economy of the "division of labour." The aim is lost, genuine culture (Kultur)--and the means, the modern traffic with science, barbarized. In this essay the "historical sense" of which this century is proud was recognized for the first time as a disease, as a typical symptom of decay. 7

Walter Kaufmann, whose scholarly views on Nietzsche are presently the most popular, describes the central problem of the essay as follows.

[It] is nothing less than the problem of Historismus, which was later developed by Ernst Troeltsch, Benedetto Croce, and Friedrich

Meinecke...the problem in which philosophy of history and theory of values meet: whether there are supra-historical values or whether all values are merely historical phenomena which are valid only in a certain place and time...the problem of the relativity of all values. 8

Werner Dannhauser agrees with Kaufmann and other scholars that the essay is indeed Nietzsche's attempt to come to terms with historicism. Dannhauser points out that this necessarily means that the essay is also an attack on Hegel.

The essay is a critique of a specific fault and defect of the time, historicism, which Nietzsche calls the historical movement, the historical trend, or the historical sense. As such it is also Nietzsche's confrontation with, and criticism of, Hegel. Against Hegel's doctrine that the historical process is a rational one which in Hegel's time has ended in an absolute moment at the zenith, Nietzsche asserts that the historical process neither is nor can be finished, that the completion of history is not only impossible but undesirable because it would lead to man's degeneration, and that history is full of madness, blindness, and injustice. 9

Historicism is the English translation of the German Historismus. Historismus is a term first used in a book by Carl Prantl in 1852 to criticize what he saw as "an inappropriate use of historical knowledge and a confusion regarding the sorts of questions which could be answered by means of such knowledge." ¹⁰ The word came into widespread use after the publication of three influential works: Ernst Troeltsch's Der Historismus und Seine Probleme (1922), Karl Mannheim's essay 'Historismus' (1924), and Friedrich Meinecke's Die Entstehung des

Historismus, 2 Vols (1936). Were one to trace the unfolding of the meaning of the word in our time, one would also have to consider the writings of Croce, Collingwood, Dilthey, Leo Strauss, Gerhard Kruger, and Karl Lowith. That, of course, is beyond the scope of this study. However, we will try to present what falls within the area of general agreement of most of these writers, and the major problems it confronts us with.

Troeltsch, Mannheim, and Meinecke were all concerned to identify historicism as both a methodological principle, the one which separates social science (Gesellschaftswissenschaft) from natural science (Naturwissenschaft), and as the idea or principle which defines our age or world-view. All of them were historicists who were deeply concerned to defend historicism from the charge of relativism. None of them succeeded in adequately doing so. Ernst Troeltsch defined historicism as "the historicizing of our entire knowing and experiencing of the spiritual world, as it has taken place in the course of the 19th century."¹¹ Troeltsch believed that the view that all aspects of the life of the mind or spirit are caught up in a continual process of change "tended to lead to an unmitigated moral and intellectual skepticism."¹² This is what he called "the crisis of historicism." The central concern of Mannheim's essay is to show how this crisis could be overcome.

The mere fact that every item of historical knowledge is determined by a particular positional perspective, and that there is an intimate fusion of the particular historical picture of every epoch with its actual aspirations and concrete values, in no way implies the relativity of the knowledge so obtained. 13

Each culture has only one set of value standards and this allows one to make an objective judgment about values. Mannheim admits that this means "that the historian can apply his value standards only to his own culture area."¹⁴ But one can also determine other cultural standards by entering into a sympathetic understanding (Verstehen) of a culture and can use that standard to measure particular values within that culture. This still leaves one at a loss as to whether, having entered into a sympathetic understanding of Greek, Roman, or Renaissance culture, one can judge whether it is better to adopt one of their standards of value or keep the one we have. And yet, what other serious purpose is there in studying the past?

Mannheim, like Troeltsch, thinks that historicism is our world-view. We see the world primarily in terms of change, growth, progress, evolution, uniqueness, and individuality. Historicism is a "dynamic philosophy of life" that has replaced the old "static philosophy of Reason."¹⁵ Reason is no longer thought to be outside of history or supra-temporal. The autonomy of theory and hence epistemology have been replaced by the doctrine of the historicity of reason and the philosophy of history.

One now looks at the different "spheres of life" in which a theory is rooted, and from which it emerged. As Mannheim puts it, "the doctrine of the autonomy of theory reveals itself to the eye of the sociologist of knowledge and the philosopher of history ... as bound to the historico-philosophical position and its corresponding
 16
 life-basis."

To understand historicism, says Mannheim, one must understand its development as a world-view. It came into being after the religiously determined medieval picture of the world had disintegrated and when the subsequent Enlightenment, with its dominant idea of a supra-temporal Reason, had destroyed itself. Meinecke traces out this development in even greater detail. It is, he says, a result of the application of the "life-principles" that emerged from the German intellectual movement beginning
 17
 with Leibniz and coming to a peak in Goethe.

Man, it was maintained, with his reason and his passions, his virtues and his vices, had remained basically the same in all periods of which we have any knowledge. This opinion was right enough at heart, but did not grasp the profound changes and the variety of forms undergone by the spiritual and intellectual life of individual men and human communities, in spite of the existence of a permanent foundation of basic human qualities. In particular, it was the prevailing concept of Natural Law, handed down from antiquity, which confirmed the belief in the stability of human nature and above all human reason. 18

Meinecke's view is that historicism emerges as the result of the successful attack on natural law. He fails to

distinguish natural law from natural right. To trace the genesis of historicism one would have to be clear as to the distinctions between ancient and modern natural right and ancient and modern natural law.¹⁹ Even so, one cannot deny that Meinecke's account makes good sense. The debunking of natural law did entail the breaking down of "the belief in the invariability of the highest human ideals and an unchanging human nature that was held to be constant for all ages."²⁰ Meinecke thought that the discovery of the "essence" of historicism would give historicism the power to cure itself--"the power to heal the wounds it has caused by this relativizing of all values."²¹ Yet the "essence" seems to leave one no closer to a non-relative standard of value.

The writings of these early sociologists of knowledge and intellectual historians have proven to be the mainstay of the thinking of modern historians about historicism. Two more recent scholarly articles on the meaning of historicism continue to define historicism as both a methodology and a world-view or "doctrine of philosophy." It is "the belief that the truth, meaning, and value of anything, i.e. the basis for any evaluation, is to be found in its history."²² Historicism is not "a specific logic of history or systematic philosophy," "a theory of inevitable historical laws or cycles," or "a way of writing history in a purely objective, impersonal and factual manner."²³ In fact, it is the opposite of the

latter because it maintains that complete objectivity is impossible.

In the social science called political theory, historicism has been defined by Arnold Brecht.

[Historicism is] the idea that all human knowledge is historically conditioned and that human beings [cannot] entirely disentangle themselves from the singular social conditions under which their minds [have] been shaped. 24

Stanley Rosen has said, somewhat ironically, that it is "the inability to distinguish between being and
25
time."

Rune's Dictionary of Philosophy gives the following definition:

The view that the history of anything can be accounted for through the discovery of its origins, that the nature of anything is entirely comprehended in its development... 26

The Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives a similar definition:

Historicism is the belief that an adequate understanding of the nature of anything and an adequate assessment of its value are to be gained by considering it in terms of the place it occupied and the role it played within a process of development. 27

In political theory there is a growing recognition of the fact that historicism questions the very possibility of political philosophy. Historicism asserts that we live within constantly shifting horizons which are themselves

created by human beings. Human reason is thus understood to be a product of the specific horizon or "socio-cultural groundwork" in which it appears. Reason cannot be thought of as a neutral arbiter which can transcend history. Both our principles of evaluation and our categories of understanding are historically variable. This leads to the belief that "it is impossible to answer the question of right and wrong or of the best social order in a universally valid manner."²⁸

In Nietzsche's view, the core of modern nihilism is historicism.²⁹ It is political dynamite. Practically speaking, it destroys men's faith in the rightness of their way of life by relativizing all values. On a theoretical level it asserts that political philosophy, as it was traditionally understood, is impossible. The attempt to answer the question of the good life in a permanent and universal way is fundamentally misguided. Political philosophy can never be more than ideology. The modern crisis is both a practical and theoretical one. One turns to Nietzsche in the hope of coming to understand the crisis brought on by historicism because he is both the architect and physician of our age, par excellence.

Having thus given some consideration as to why one ought to study Nietzsche's political philosophy, as well as where one begins to do so, we must next turn to the question of how one studies Nietzsche. This means we must consider the question of how one reads the books of a political philosopher. We shall pass over the question of

the literary character of Nietzsche's work as a whole. An examination of some of Nietzsche's most prominent statements on reading and writing are sufficient for present purposes.

Nietzsche demands much from his reader. In almost every book he wrote, he makes it clear that he does not mean to be understood by everyone or even most people. In this sense, Nietzsche's aristocratic radicalism shines through. He says that there has perhaps never yet been a good reader of his books. His standards are so manifestly high and uncompromising that only a fool would begin by assuming that the reason Nietzsche's books do not make sense to him is because he is more sensible than Nietzsche.

In a written preface to the public lectures On the Future of our Educational Institutions, which he presented at Basel University in 1871, Nietzsche lists the qualities of a good reader.

The reader from whom I expect something must have three qualities: he must be calm and read without haste, he must not always interpose himself and his 'cultivation,' and finally he may not, as a concluding result, expect new tablets. I speak not of new tablets and plans for the gymnasias and schools... 30

Nietzsche first elaborates on the third quality. The reader must not be looking for immediate practical guidance in order to make political and social reforms. He should not be looking for an ideology. The man who is

eager to throw himself under the wheels of modern life is incapable of the leisure necessary to read well. He only looks as far as is necessary in order to act, to justify those passions he already feels. This leads to Nietzsche's elaboration on what is meant by a calm reader. For such a reader, reflection is pleasant for its own sake. Nietzsche says that the good reader still thinks while reading, understands the secret of reading between the lines and reflects on what he has read long after he read it. But it is the remaining quality that Nietzsche holds to be the most important. A good reader does not measure what an author says using himself and his cultivation as the standard. The good reader is not one of "those quite unreflective people, who, as historians, write in the naive belief that just their age is right in all its popular opinions and that to write in accordance with the times comes to the same thing as being just." ³¹

If education is primarily to reveal our ignorance, one cannot judge an author on the basis of whether, in one's ignorance, one agrees with the author. One does not use one's own education to measure a great book, but a great book to measure one's own education.

Nietzsche gives some further indication of what he expects from a good reader in his Untimely Considerations. The good reader attempts to "understand the architecture of a book." ³² Only a few will be good readers. Most, Nietzsche says, either cannot or will not understand the books written by great thinkers. This does not mean that

the philosopher is dishonest. Nietzsche says that, unlike most, the philosopher writes "honestly." He writes honestly about his own experiences which have to do with philosophy or the love of wisdom. He writes with reference to experiences that only a few are even capable of. This means that to most men the philosopher remains silent. Most men do not, for example, have the experience of a radical skepticism concerning the idea of justice that guides the moral life of our age. We take the ideals of equality, compassion, and human rights for granted. To call the basis of morality into question for most men would not even be desirable were it possible. For only a very few have "the time and the will for profound serious reflection." "Everything imposes upon us silence, the
33
five-year silence of the Pythagoreans."

The theme of silence becomes even more prominent in the prefaces Nietzsche wrote in 1886 to five of his books that were to be republished. These prefaces are a valuable guide to Nietzsche's views on the requirements of reading philosophical books. In the preface to Volume I of Human All-too-Human he repeats that one of the defects of modern readers is that they no longer expect or look for a double sense to the text. He approvingly refers to the medieval saying that "one only remains a philosopher
34
by being silent." Philosophers, he suggests, always write for both the many and the few. The double sense of their books is a way of remaining silent to the many and

hence remaining a philosopher, which often simply meant avoiding persecution. In the preface to Volume II of the same work, Nietzsche explains the "art of silence" in terms of the relationship between experience and understanding. One can understand Nietzsche's thoughts only on the basis of the same experience--the love of wisdom. Nietzsche says he has learned "the solitary man's way of speaking which only the most silent and suffering understand."³⁵

Such a man knows that "one should speak only where one cannot remain silent -- the rest is all chatter, 'literature' and bad breeding."³⁶ In the preface to his next book, The Dawn, Nietzsche again speaks about what he understands to be the art of reading and why one must master that art given Nietzsche's own art of writing.

It is not for nothing that I have been a philologist, perhaps I am a philologist still, that is to say, a teacher of slow reading: in the end I also write slowly ... --this art does not so easily get anything done, it teaches one to read well, that is to say, to read slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, with reservations, with doors left open, with delicate eyes and fingers... 37

In the following book, The Gay Science, Nietzsche ironically waits until the end of the book before forcefully reminding the reader that reading books written by men like himself, philosophers, is problematic. Political philosophers do not write for everybody, and most philosophers were political.

On the question of being understandable--One does not only wish to be understood when one writes; one wishes just as surely not to be understood. It is not by any means necessarily an objection to a book when anyone finds it impossible to understand: perhaps that was part of the author's intention--he did not want to be understood by just "anybody." All the nobler spirits and tastes select their audience when they wish to communicate; and choosing that, one at the same time erects barriers against "the others." All the more subtle laws of any style have their origin at this point: they at the same time keep away, create a distance, forbid "entrance," understanding, as said above--while they open the ears of those whose ears are related to ours. 38

Nietzsche is here explaining why he adopted the aphoristic style. He gives two reasons. First, because it is the only way that some problems can be approached and understood; second, because it protects most people from understanding the problems. "For being an immoralist, one has to take steps against corrupting innocents ..."

39

In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche gives what amounts to an explicit restatement of what he said in the Gay Science.

Our highest insights must--and should--sound like follies and sometimes like crimes when they are heard without permission by those who are not predisposed and predestined for them. The difference between the exoteric and the esoteric, formerly known to philosophers--among the Indians as among the Greeks, Persians, and Muslims, in short, wherever one believed in order of rank and not in equality and equal rights--does not so much consist in this, that the exoteric approach comes from outside and sees, estimates, measures, and judges from the outside, not the inside: what is much more essential is that the exoteric approach sees things from below, the esoteric looks down from above. 40

Finally, in the section of Ecce Homo called "Why I Write Such Good Books," Nietzsche speaks once more about reading and writing. One must learn to read leisurely, without always having one eye on how one can assimilate the views of the author to one's own. One must read slowly and carefully. Careful reading may turn up contradictions and even blatant errors. Nietzsche reminds us that the art of reading between the lines might help us shed light on why philosophers make "mistakes." One thus always runs the risk of overinterpreting a text but overinterpretation is surely a less dangerous and more easily vanquished danger than underinterpretation. The reader does all this with the hope that he will uncover the architecture of the text and thereby the author's intention. That intention is the ordering principle of the text. To understand an author's intention is to think his thoughts the way he thought them.

Nietzsche does not write for everyone. His art of esoteric writing is based on his knowledge of the relationship between experience and understanding. He writes in such a way as to remain silent about many things to those who have not ascended to his perspective. He often uses the revealing metaphor of mountain climbing to describe the relationship between experience and understanding. The man on the peak has more in common with one half-way up than one still in the valley. They can discuss, in terms that make sense to both, the whole range of perspectives at least up to half-way. But no

matter how much the peak dweller might describe the view from the top, and the climber imagine what he means, the climber cannot see what the peak dweller sees. He cannot understand because he lacks experience.

What experience is Nietzsche talking about? One is reminded by Nietzsche's metaphor of the mountain of another famous philosophical allegory--the cave. The ascent is from opinion to knowledge. One ascends to the world of being from the world of becoming. The metaphor of the mountain is somewhat different. One ascends from a very narrow horizon to the greatest possible earthly horizon. Perhaps, at the greatest heights, there is no horizon at all. We shall have to consider Nietzsche's idea of horizon in greater detail as it presents itself in the text. Suffice it to say that Nietzsche most certainly indicates that while one may not understand many parts of his books because one lacks the experiences to illuminate what he says, one can gain those very experiences from reading and trying very hard to understand his books. Nietzsche suggests that we can experience the activity of philosophizing from studying his books.

As we saw, Nietzsche suggested numerous reasons why he writes esoterically, i.e., why he is a political philosopher. Most philosophers wrote politically because they feared, among other things, persecution. Nietzsche obviously did not have to entertain such fears, at least after he left Basel. The reasons, as we have seen, seem

to be of two sorts. One might well be a kind of generosity. He does not wish to harm or corrupt innocents. The other seems to be a sense of justice. Nietzsche thinks that there are things that only the few should be told. He writes with a sense of rank, looking for those few "noble" souls like himself. Such men "see things from above." To them Nietzsche's insights do not sound like follies. More importantly, they can be trusted with those insights because they are not primarily interested in using them for ends other than insight itself into the nature of things.

Having said all this, I should add that much of Nietzsche's essay remains silent to me. Our author's art of writing is extremely subtle and one could doubtless raise serious objections to my understanding of "noble readers" and the relationship between experience and understanding that informs that art as I have presented it. Reading Nietzsche is a problem and thus so is writing about Nietzsche. How, then, is one supposed to write about Nietzsche? I have adopted the form of an interpretive essay or commentary--an explication de texte. A commentary seems most fitting for two reasons. It is the way Nietzsche suggested one write about him, and it allows one to write pertinently about a text before having fully divined the author's intent.

In the preface to The Genealogy of Morals, written in 1887, Nietzsche states that one must master the art of

exegesis in order to comprehend his books. The third essay of The Genealogy of Morals is intended to serve as an example of this art. It is a sixty-page commentary on an aphorism from Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The aphorism is two lines long. Two years later, in a letter to Carl Fuchs, Nietzsche says that should someone come to write about him he should "have the cleverness, which unfortunately no one up to now has had, to characterize me, to describe but not to evaluate..."⁴⁴ A commentary does not attempt to evaluate but elucidate. Elucidation necessarily precedes evaluation. One might indeed hope, at some point, to be in such a position as would give one the right to evaluate Nietzsche (and other philosophers). Failing that, writing a commentary seems the most reasonable alternative. It gets one closer to having the right to make an evaluation.

Writing a commentary allows one to write intelligently and usefully about a book before one knows that book as well as the author. To know a book as well as the author is the goal of any serious reader. The effort involved in writing a serious commentary allows one to move towards that goal. In the case of Nietzsche, the requirements Nietzsche imposes upon his readers perhaps make commentary the only way to move towards understanding his political philosophy.

In the following commentary on The Use and Disadvantage of 'Historie' for Life, I try to make the structure of the

essay as clear as possible. Why does Nietzsche begin where he does? Why does each part follow in the order it does? Why does Nietzsche remain silent about certain things or talk of them in a strangely Delphic manner? I attempt to shed some light on each of these questions in order that Nietzsche's intention may be seen more clearly. Above all, this is an attempt to better understand the fundamental problem and starting point of Nietzsche's philosophy -- historicism. For Nietzsche makes a persuasive case that the culture of the West is rapidly declining and that historicism is the underlying cause of that decline.

II. COMMENTARY ON THE USE AND DISADVANTAGE OF HISTORIE FOR LIFE

The Title and Preface

The title of Nietzsche's essay on history is Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben. The best translation of this is The Use and Disadvantage of 'Historie' for Life. We shall simply use the German Historie wherever it appears. This is because there are two German words which can be translated as 'history': Historie and Geschichte. The latter finds its root in the verb geschehen, which means to happen, occur, chance, come to pass or take place. The noun Geschehene means "what is done, accomplished facts, or what has happened." Geschichte is closely related in meaning. It means "the events or series of events of the past." This can include a tale, story, narrative, or report about those things which have actually occurred. We shall translate this word as "history," meaning the events of the past and accounts given of past events. Historie comes from the Greek word historia which meant inquiry into things, oracles, or people. It suggests systematic observation and investigation. It attempts to ascend to a kind of knowledge. A histor, for example, was a learned man. The emphasis is on seeing with one's own eyes and investigating oneself. Because its goal is knowledge, it means that one could thus give a reasoned account of one's

inquiries and investigations. The word eventually took on the narrower meaning of inquiry into things that had happened but still emphasized the activity of inquiring into and considering things past. Historie could perhaps be better translated as historiology. It suggests a reasoned account where Geschichte need mean nothing more than a tale or story about what happened. The most important difference in meaning is that Geschichte refers primarily to events that have happened, i.e., that which is the object of inquiry. Historie refers to the activity of inquiring into and accounting for those events. ⁴⁵

Nietzsche's concern is with the use and disadvantage of inquiry into and consideration of the past for life. Historie is not always useful for life. Life is to serve as our standard of value for Historie. One is compelled to wonder why Nietzsche makes life and not knowledge the standard. His doing so suggests that there is a tension between life and knowledge because Historie is always useful for knowledge of some kind. Modern historiography claims to be a social science. Historie produces scientific history which is understood to be knowledge of the highest type, science. Nietzsche's title further suggests that there may be a tension between life and the highest type of knowledge.

Here we are reminded of the first modern philosopher to criticize the popular view, which emerged from the Enlightenment, that the relationship between philosophy or science and politics can indeed be a harmonious one.

Rousseau argued that the advancement of the arts and sciences has proven harmful to political life because the arts and sciences corrupt civic virtue. "Here the effect is certain, the depravity real, and our souls have been corrupted in proportion to the advancement of our arts and sciences toward perfection." Men are no longer capable of the happiness that comes from leading the virtuous life of a good citizen.⁴⁶

The title suggests that the fundamental issue of Nietzsche's essay is similar, if not the same, as the one presented by Rousseau--the problem of the tension between philosophy and politics. This tension has been the theme of political philosophy since it was first founded by Socrates. The classical formulation of this theme is the tension between the city and the philosopher as it comes to light in Plato's Apology of Socrates and Republic. It is this theme that Nietzsche reformulates as the tension between knowledge and life.

Nietzsche begins the preface by quoting Germany's greatest poet by name. We are reminded that this is the only one of the four Untimely Considerations that does not have a famous German in the title. The other essays are about David Strauss, Schopenhauer, and Wagner. And this is the only one of the four essays with a preface. Goethe's name does not appear in the title but it appears in the opening sentences of the preface. And Goethe is quoted and mentioned by name more than any other in this essay. Nietzsche thus seems to suggest some connection

between Goethe and the problem of historicism.

"Moreover, I hate everything that merely instructs me without increasing or directly enlivening my activity."

Goethe said this in a letter to Schiller upon reading

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Kant's Anthropology. Nietzsche here identifies himself

with Goethe. This means that he implicitly includes

philosophy, as it has been understood since Kant, in his condemnation of mere instruction. Goethe's remark, says

Nietzsche, is to stand at the head of our consideration of the value and disvalue of Historie, like Cato the Censor's

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ceterum censeo that Carthage must be destroyed.

Nietzsche presents Goethe as a German Cato. This is the

essay's explicit perspective. It is the perspective of

the good citizen. Cato was the great guardian of Roman

virtue. In this eyes, the greatest danger to Rome was not

Carthage but the influx of foreign customs and ideas. The

charms of cosmopolitanism would make men soft and corrupt.

The greatest danger of all was philosophy.

Philosophy entails a radical questioning, and often a debunking, of civic virtue. Nietzsche presents himself in agreement with Cato because he is about to attack

Historie, which presents itself as both philosophical and scientific. He speaks for the great founder of German culture because this Historie is destroying that culture.

Nietzsche says he will show why knowledge (Wissen)

which enfeebles activity, why Historie when it has become

a superfluity and luxury of the cognition (Erkenntnis),

must be seriously hated. He shares Goethe's sentiment and

is going to persuade us through argument that this sentiment is correct. We should hate mere instruction. For we lack what is most necessary, and the superfluous is an enemy of the necessary. It should go without saying that he is here speaking of the needs of the soul or psyche and not the body. What is necessary is knowledge which enlivens or quickens activity. This suggests two kinds of knowledge: knowledge about what are the good things and knowledge about how to get those things. For all human beings direct their activity towards getting what they believe to be the good. Action requires only opinion, preferably right opinion, about what the good things are. Historie ought to thus provide us with a comprehensive view of the good and the good life, which is the life of the man who gets the good things. It should shun charming "metaphysical subtleties" and teach men "those truths that hold the happiness of the human
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race."

Nietzsche contrasts the needs of the active man with those of the "spoiled idlers in the garden of knowledge." These are the learned men, the scholars and intellectuals, who desire Historie for the sake of a comfortable withdrawal from life and action, or to cover up a selfish life and cowardly, base acts. The needs of the active man are the genuine human needs. This does not mean that one ought to equate the idle life with leisure. For the life of leisure is the life of the mind. It is a life devoted

to attempting to answer the question of what is the good life, i.e., what are the genuine human necessities. The idle men of knowledge use Historie as a way to avoid this inquiry. The most important use of Historie would be in the service of such an inquiry.

Our age has lost sight of all the proper uses of Historie. We now suffer from an excess of Historie. We historicize everything without even thinking about it. It is second nature for us. This is historicism. Its effect is relativism and, ultimately, nihilism. It causes life to degenerate because men no longer have clear ideas about what is right or noble. Our age shows plenty of evidence of this degeneration of life, and Nietzsche says that it is as necessary as it may be painful to experience the extent to which we ourselves are the decadent products of our age. We must come to know ourselves as decadents if we are to begin to overcome that decadence in ourselves.

Self-knowledge is a necessity of life because it is only through such knowledge that one can begin to arrest the degeneration of life caused by historicism. Nietzsche's essay is an attempt to gain such knowledge. "I have made an effort to describe a sentiment (Empfindung) which has often tortured me; I revenge myself on it in that I reveal it to the public." What is this sentiment? It is the painful consciousness of one's own decadence, of the ill health of one's soul. To be a product of our age, an age which suffers from the excess of Historie, is to be a decadent.

The public, to whom Nietzsche is describing his sentiment, will be Nietzsche's means of revenge. Their criticism will be of two different kinds. There may be someone, he says, who will say that he has not felt this sentiment purely and originally enough, and that he has therefore failed to clearly articulate it. "A few may think so perhaps." But most will say his sentiment is "perverted, unnatural, repulsive, and utterly illegal." Such a sentiment is held to be unworthy of "the powerful historical direction-of-the-age." For them, the historicist world-view, predominant since Hegel and Marx, is the standard by which Nietzsche's sentiment is to be judged. These are the timely men, the ones for whom the view of our time is the only view possible. They take the timely view that our age is the standard by which one must judge all ages. Those other critics, the few who point to Nietzsche's failure to clearly articulate his sentiment, are in agreement with Nietzsche that this sentiment is a correct one. Who are these few? They are Nietzsche's true judges.⁵⁰ They are the ones who know even better than he about decadence. It is these few who are the public Nietzsche is most concerned with.

By daring to come forward with a "natural description" of his sentiment, Nietzsche says that he has done nothing improper. And he benefits by being "publically reprimanded and instructed about our age." He is convinced that his description will more likely promote the general propriety than injure it because he is giving

his critics ample opportunity to say polite things about their age and impolite things about him. And Nietzsche will be instructed by what these men say about their age and about him. This instruction is presumably more than "mere instruction." It is knowledge in the service of life. By seeing how the men of our age react to Nietzsche's criticism, Nietzsche gains a better understanding of human nature and the effect our age has had on that nature.

Nietzsche says that this consideration is also untimely because he has tried to understand (verstehen) that of which the age is so proud as a major defect. This is its historical "formative--education" or cultivation (Bildung). This kind of education is the result of a "consuming historical fever" from which modern man suffers. Our virtue, the historical sense, has become so overnourished (hypertrophic) that we can now historicize everything. The result is an arid and paralyzing education which destroys life. Nietzsche wants to remind us of the real value of the historical sense. It is a virtue only so far as it serves life; it is not good in itself.

Nietzsche's essay is untimely in two respects: his description of his sentiment and his understanding of a virtue as a vice. This raises the question of relationship between Nietzsche's sentiment and his understanding. Which came first? Nietzsche points to the

answer in the conclusion to the preface. He says that he ought to be exonerated because these sentiments are his own and the result of his untimely education. "Only so far as I am the nursling of ancient times, especially of the Greeks, have I come to such untimely experiences as a child of this time." The Greeks have cultivated a sentiment in him that makes him experience his own age as decadent. Nietzsche's essay is an attempt to explain this sentiment to himself and us. It is through this attempt that he has come to understand our age as decadent.

The theme of the essay, as it emerges in the preface, is the conflict between knowledge and life. Nietzsche suggests that this conflict can only be reconciled by education that leads to culture. Such an education is an untimely education. It means gaining a perspective that is outside the horizon of one's own age. This allows one to make a judgment about one's own times. Nietzsche's attack on historicism is an attempt to make culture or a liberal education, which is the true cultivation of the soul, again possible. Historical education cannot lead to culture because the objects of study are of historical and not practical interest. Only if one studies the examples and ideas of the past as living alternatives does that study lead to more life, that is, to culture.

The Problem of Historie: Chapter 1.

Nietzsche begins his essay by entreating his reader to consider (betrachte) herd animals. Such a consideration is always untimely. It forces one to reflect on the timeless question of what are the uniquely human things. This is a question that persists in spite of human evolution. To what extent is man nothing more than a herd animal? To what extent is the desire for community and friendship nothing more than a herd instinct? Herd animals "do not know what yesterday, what today is." The idea of time and the consciousness of temporality are uniquely human. Herd animals have no sense of the endless repetition of their lives. They are pained by neither boredom nor melancholy. Their lack of a sense for the past means they also lack a sense for the future. They do not live, like man, constantly in the shadow of the fear of death. For these reasons they gain a sort of blind happiness. Man, on the other hand, knows what the concepts of yesterday and today mean. He has a historical sense. He can see becoming because he can distinguish what changes from what remains the same. He is pained when he considers the happiness, or at least the contentment, of herd animals. He wants nothing other than to be happy but the historical sense brings with it boredom and melancholy. With every happiness comes the realization that it can't last. The human predicament is that man cannot learn to forget like a herd animal but is

nonetheless in envy of the happiness that comes from a
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 completely unselfconscious herd-like existence.

Nietzsche's intention is to show what would be involved in reconciling the historical sense and the desire for happiness.

The man who makes this consideration, says Nietzsche, is pained by it. This pain forces him to wonder. He wonders about herd-animals and himself as a herd-animal. Man's desire to exist as an individual is in constant tension with his desire for community. Nietzsche suggests that the former is more fundamentally human because we will not trade our way of life for the way of animals. Men will trade the high for the low for the sake of the happiness of animals but will be shamed by doing so. This happiness is not a real human alternative. The happiness of animals is no longer a real human alternative once one is conscious of being more than a herd animal. Such consciousness is what it means to be human. Nietzsche's attempt at a reconciliation must aim at preserving the historical sense while allowing for a more noble kind of happiness.

Nietzsche continues his consideration of the life of herd animals. They live only in the present; each moment fades quickly into darkness. They are completely self-forgetting and for that reason they live honestly (Ehrlich). By this Nietzsche means they can only seem to be what they are. They are incapable of dissimulation.

Nietzsche holds this honesty (Ehrlichkeit), which both animals and children have, to be natural. Man becomes dishonest. He is "chained to the past" which is an ever-increasing burden. He must often deny it out of pride. Man thus easily becomes a sort of actor, forced to lead a painful and dishonest existence. When he looks upon animals and children he cannot help but feel envy. It is as though he can see there a kind of lost paradise, a natural condition that he once shared. Here Nietzsche's account echoes Rousseau's description of the state of nature. Man is separated from nature in human society by his "culture," which is a product of history. But this culture seems to be both the source of our pride and the cause for a deep longing to again live honestly. Every child is called out of that paradise when it comes to understand (Verstehen) the phrase "it was", "the password which brings struggle, sorrow and boredom, reminding him of what his being-there (Dasein) fundamentally is: a never to be fulfilled imperfection."

Man's longing for happiness may indeed cause him to envy the self-forgetting of herd animals. Can man, to the extent that he is more than a herd animal, long for self-forgetting? Perhaps this happens in all too many cases, but Nietzsche seems to suggest that it is rooted in a fundamental mistake. The self-forgetting that comes with work, intoxication, or entertainment is always only pleasant as the counterpart to self-consciousness. It is never fully satisfying. The pleasure comes from being

released from the painful awareness that death approaches. But self-forgetting is unsatisfying because we want to be both self-conscious and happy. The best way of life would somehow combine the two--a life that prepares one to face death. This suggests the life of philosophy.

Death, says Nietzsche, sets its seal on this recognition (Erkenntnis): "being-there is only an uninterrupted having-been, a thing which thereby lives to deny and consume itself, to contradict itself." Without any historical sense, any sense of our having-been, we would have no sense of being-there. We could have no consciousness of self, no ability to distinguish ourselves as individuals. A child becomes human when its memory is developed enough for speech. Without the historical sense we could not become human but would remain two-footed, featherless herd animals.

Human historicity makes our becoming human possible. At the same time the ascent from mere herd existence to human being-there is to man something that is fundamentally painful. Nietzsche says that if it is happiness that binds living things to life, then no philosophy would be more right than the Cynic's. Happiness would be valued for its utility. A low but steady happiness would be better than that which is intense but periodic. On this view happiness is the means to life and not its goal. What matters most is self-preservation. The desire for happiness is thus reducible

to the will to live.

Nietzsche establishes the fundamental importance of forgetting as follows. Happiness requires action, and all human action is directed by one's opinions about the good. Action requires forgetting insofar as one needs a clear, firm opinion about the good. One must forget all the competing alternatives revealed by history and anthropology. One must forget what history seems to prove: since all societies and Cultures have different opinions about the good, there is no one right opinion. Human understanding is thought to be relative to time and place. For the man who was completely incapable of forgetting would be lost in "the stream of becoming." 54

Like the proper student of Heraclitus, he would "hardly dare to raise a finger." He would be paralyzed by indecision. Like a man forced to go without sleep, he would soon wither and die. Forgetting is thus more fundamental than remembering because we can be happy without remembering, as the animals show, while remembering can destroy life by making it impossible to act. 55 As Nietzsche puts it, "there is a degree of remembering, of historical sense, which can injure and destroy every living thing, be it man, a people (Volk) or a Culture (Kultur)."

Nietzsche's assertion that the man who was completely incapable of forgetting would be condemned to everywhere see becoming means that our perception of "Being" or permanence is really an illusion. "Being" is the result

of a forgetfulness, of not fully remembering and hence not seeing change. One can here detect Nietzsche's skepticism of traditional metaphysics. His critique of philosophy is a criticism of the Western tradition of metaphysics, of the belief in "Being" which still persists in Hegelian philosophy. And it is at the same time, a critique of rational basis of morality. For what is left of morality if there is neither a divine nor a metaphysical basis on which to ground it?

Nietzsche thus raises the question of how action can be directed towards happiness if we have no fixed points to guide us. He argues that all life has an unhistorical component. Animals have overpowering natural instincts which direct and limit their activity. In human beings, these instincts are either non-existent or so weak that the latitude nature allows for human behavior is so great that human beings are forced to think about what is good. Human reason is thus, by necessity, more than instrumental reason. The question of what is happiness or what is the good life is permanent question throughout human history. Action requires the belief that the fundamental assumptions of one's age, which are taken to be truths and not simply assumptions, provide a permanent answer to this question. The historical sense can call these truths which appear as wisdom into question by showing their origin. Can one take rights seriously, for example, if he believes they are merely the political epiphenomena of

capitalism? The belief in a permanent answer to the fundamental question is undermined by the historical sense and wisdom is no longer thought possible, unless by wisdom one means the recognition of the historical process.

The argument Nietzsche wishes to put forward is that historicism has come into being because we have lost sight of the fundamental importance of the unhistorical aspect of all life. Human life depends upon a balance between the unhistorical and the historical, on our seeing change as defined within (what at least appear to be) permanent bearings. There must, therefore, be certain limits on the historical sense.

To determine the degree beyond which the historical sense becomes harmful, one must "know precisely how great the plastic strength (plastische Kraft) of a man, a people or a Culture is." The limit on one's plastic strength sets the rightful limit to one's historical sense. Plastic strength means "the strength to develop uniquely from within, to transform and assimilate the past and alien, to recover completely from wounds, to redeem losses, and refashion broken forms." What the historical sense disrupts or destroys must be healed or replaced by one's plastic strength.

Some men possess so little of this plastic strength that the memory of a single, delicate injustice is enough to destroy them. Others are strong enough that the historical sense can do them no harm whatsoever. This strength, Nietzsche says, is determined by the roots of a

man's inner nature. "The stronger the roots of a man's inner nature, the more of the past he will appropriate or master." The most powerful natures can be recognized by their immunity to harm by the historical sense.

"What such a nature cannot master, it knows how to forget ...; the horizon is closed and complete, and nothing is able to make him remember that beyond it there are still men, sorrows, teachings, and goals." Here Nietzsche states one of the essay's most important themes. "And this is a universal law; every living thing can become healthy, strong, and productive only within a horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself and yet too selfish to enclose its vision within another's horizon, then it will fall into feeble decline or go hastily to a timely demise (Untergange)."

Our horizon is that set of fundamental assumptions we have about the world, which we take to be self-evident truths. The goals by which we guide our lives, make sense of our experience, and serve as our standards of value form this horizon.⁵⁶ These are our heartfelt opinions about the most important things, about what is the good. These opinions are second-nature to us. One might call the horizon which forms this second nature our ideology or world-view. Socrates referred to it as "the cave." Socrates would certainly agree with Nietzsche that all life must necessarily come into being within a horizon. To the extent that historicism makes us conscious that our

ways are arbitrary, our beliefs part of a historically changing ideology, that our "values" are historically relative, it destroys our horizon and the fundamental starting point of all life. One comes to believe that horizons are acts of human creativity and not reason. One can no longer even make the distinction between knowledge and opinion. For knowledge itself is now understood to be relative to time. The historical sense, by showing the transitory nature of horizons, shows that there are no permanent truths from which man can seek to guide his life. Yet historicism is our horizon. It is taken as a self-evident truth in our age that all values are historically relative. Historicism is thus a nihilistic horizon. It destroys itself as a horizon by revealing that it is merely a horizon—one horizon among many.

Does Nietzsche think that man can transcend history? Nietzsche and Socrates apparently part company on this issue. Socrates argued that one could get out of the cave and come to behold the world of "Being." The transcendence of history was always the goal of philosophy. It was thus that the ascent from opinion to knowledge was accomplished. Nietzsche is suggesting that it is the belief in the possibility of transcending history that lies behind the debunking of horizons by the historical sense. What one instead finds is that outside the cave there is no permanent and beautiful realm of being to behold but only an abyss of cold, empty darkness and annihilation.

It is our inner nature which enables us to feel "with a strong instinct when it is necessary to experience historically and when unhistorically." Nietzsche's argument seems to be that our inner nature is a reflection and hence a product of our horizon. Only a few are capable of reasonably examining and analyzing their horizon. For most men, one's horizon is the standard of evaluation, not the object of it. And only a very rare few have the plastic strength to survive the unlimited scrutiny and debunking of their horizon. These rare few are capable of replacing the shattered opinions of this horizon with knowledge, or at least opinions that seem to have a firmer foundation. Our time harbors the prejudice that the historical sense should be cultivated to its fullest extent by all men. All men should be enlightened. Nietzsche's argument is that this democratic prejudice is a dangerous one. For most men, the unlimited cultivation of the historical sense debunks their present convictions without replacing them. He invites his reader to consider this untimely proposition: "the unhistorical and the historical are equally necessary for the good health of an individual, a people and a Culture."

First Nietzsche establishes the importance of the unhistorical. A man may have a horizon that is no broader than that of an inhabitant of an Alpine valley and yet lead a healthy and happy life. Next to him stands the enlightened and knowledgeable man whose horizon has long since disappeared and who no longer has anything to

believe in. He has nothing to give his life purpose or meaning because he knows all values are historically relative. His superior knowledge makes him incapable of rude willing and desiring. The happiness of the man with a narrow but solid horizon is thus compared to the paralysis of the man with a horizon expanded to the point it vanishes from sight. The unhistorical is the original and hence more important aspect of experience. The capacity to perceive historically must never be developed to the point where one's horizon is destroyed. Healthy life means strong will and desires. These depend on a resolute belief in the rightness of one's goals and justice of one's cause. It is our idea of justice which fundamentally forms our horizon.

Not only is the rudely provincial man capable of healthy life, in opposition to the so-called educated man. Even the animal is in some ways superior. Its horizon is no bigger than a point and yet it is certainly happy, or at least lives without boredom or dissimulation. Here Nietzsche elliptically raises the possibility that animals are not happy but he still suggests that they are better off than life condemned to live with no horizon. Modern human life, life within the horizon of the Enlightenment, has decayed to the point of being worse than the life of animals. This is because the Enlightenment as a horizon has destroyed itself. It fostered the democratic development of the historical sense with no consideration

for the necessity of the unhistorical.

The historical sense originates within the unhistorical. The latter is a necessary condition for the development of the historical sense and hence for man's becoming human. If the historical sense completely destroys the unhistorical, it might well destroy itself. Man becomes human by limiting the unhistorical element to life through "thinking, reflecting, comparing, separating, and joining." It is not just memory that accounts for the historical sense but reason. "Only so far as a bright lightning flash of light occurs within that dark cloud [of the unhistorical] ... does man become man." Such is our strength to use the past for life and refashion what has happened into history. Yet, with the excess of Historie man again ceases. We can impose or create an interpretation of the past only if we have permanent standards by which we establish our criteria of selection and interpretation of human motives. These standards, Nietzsche seems to suggest, come from our horizon, or at least originate there. The historical sense calls justice into question by calling the permanent things into question. For justice must be based on either God or nature. Historie shows that neither are permanent because they have a genesis and a history. But we can no longer make history without a belief in the permanent ground of justice.

Nietzsche here illustrates his point with the following example:

Visualize a man, tossed and torn by a violent passion, for a woman or a great thought: how this alters his world ... All evaluations are altered and devalued; there is so much he can no longer esteem because he can hardly feel it any more; ... he wonders that his memory so tirelessly turns in a circle and is yet too weak and tired to make a single leap out of this circle.

The passion that Nietzsche describes here is the love of that which is closest to us and most our own. That is our passionate and unconscious devotion to the horizon of opinion into which we were born and raised. To the extent to which our souls are fundamentally formed by that horizon, this love is nothing other than self-love. It is love that forces us to close our ears to criticism of our beloved and to stop thinking when our horizon of opinion is called into question. Righteous indignation begins where we think the self-evident truth appears. It is this love, which is capable of arousing great spiritedness, that is the necessary condition for all action. Such love distinguishes the active from the inactive man. Modern man has become inactive. His scholarly education has undercut any love he might have had for the great ideas that define his age. Historicism, along with scientific value-relativism, has almost completely undermined the great hope and faith Western man once had for liberalism and the idea of progress embodied in it. He now "knows" that the truth or right is relative to history. The active man, on the other hand, knows only one right--"the right of that which should come to be." His passion limits his historical sense and his consideration of

history. He believes in the timelessness and universality of justice as it presents itself to him and lives in a condition that is both unhistorical and anti-historical. The man of action is thus without both conscience and knowledge. He loves his deed more than it ought to be loved because he fails to recognize the narrowness of his own horizon. His evaluations are based not upon reason but upon passion. Nietzsche is thus raising the question of whether there can be any other basis for evaluation than passion that can be reconciled with action. Could there be any action without the unhistorical? Are there, in other words, any standards that reason can come to know and would thus allow a man's actions to be rooted in knowledge rather than opinion or passion?

Having described the relation between the unhistorical and the historical, Nietzsche now brings forth a third concept: the superhistorical.

If someone could, in numerous instances, discern and breathe again the unhistorical atmosphere in which every great historical (geschichtliche) event comes to be, then such a one, as a cognitive essence (Wesen), might perhaps elevate himself to a superhistorical standpoint ... the possible result of historical consideration.

The superhistorical man is the man with the historical insight: all men live within historically shifting horizons. All thought and action is tied to history. There is no permanent, comprehensive horizon for man as

man. There is no natural horizon; there are no natural values.

Nietzsche quotes the famous German historian Niebhur on the purpose of studying history. We study it to know what the great actors of history did not know, how arbitrary are the forms through which men see and insist upon others seeing. This means that we understand the men of the past better than they understood themselves. For they could not have done what they did, knowing as we know that beyond their horizon lay numerous unexamined possibilities, objections, criticisms, and ways of seeing and understanding the world. All of these would only serve to undermine the active man's certainty in the rightness of his goal and thus undermine action itself.

Nietzsche does not seem to disagree with the historical insight. He seems to say that while it is true it is also extremely dangerous. Human activity, above all, politics, cannot be directed towards any ends if there is no faith in the simple rightness and justice of those ends. The historical sense, especially as it has become manifest in modern philosophy and science, is politically dangerous. Modern philosophy seems to have become oblivious to these political dangers. It seems to have lost all sight of the possibility Nietzsche asserts as fact, that only a few are capable of the unlimited development of the historical sense. Nietzsche is attacking modern philosophy's seeming lack of awareness that its primary concern must be the health of the culture upon which it depends for its own

continued survival. What remains paradoxical, and hence puzzling, about Nietzsche's presentation is his explicit presentation of the historical insight which is the basis of historicism. This suggests that Nietzsche holds no hope in our forgetting the historical insight as a solution but rather in our clearly remembering and reflecting upon it. Such reflection leads one to ask whether historicism is not the form through which we accidentally see the world and vehemently insist others see. How can one, on the one hand, believe that all truth is tied to history and, on the other hand, believe that this truth is permanent and superhistorical? The belief in historicism and the belief in transcendence are irreconcilable as long as the superhistorical is understood as the permanent truths that are grasped by reason. This suggests that we must re-think the notion of the superhistorical.

Nietzsche continues his discussion of the superhistorical by raising the question of how one can tell who those who have been trained (vorgebildet) for the superhistorical are. Look, he says, for the reasons your acquaintances would give for saying no when asked whether they would wish to relive the last ten or twenty years. The historical men say no because they believe that progress guides the historical process. Therefore the next twenty years will be better than the last. "Their view of the past guides them toward the future, inflames

their spiritedness to continue to take part in life, and kindles the hope that right is yet coming, that happiness sits behind the next mountain towards which they are striding." They can see salvation in the historical process. It is this which defines them in opposition to the superhistorical man. The latter sees no salvation in the historical process. For him the world is, at every moment, complete. "What could ten new years teach that the past ten could not possibly teach!"

The difference between the historical and the superhistorical man is the way in which they understand the relationship between knowledge and history. The former believes that the meaning of his being-there will become clearer with time because that meaning is illuminated by the historical process. Here one might well think that Nietzsche is referring to the rise of the "historical school" in German philosophy, founded by Kant and made prominent by Hegel and his epigoni. Hegel believed he had discovered the arche of history. The principles that govern the historical process explain the meaning of our lives and become clearer as the historical process unfolds. For the historical man, human happiness depends on history. He thus believes that politics can bring about a solution to the problem of happiness. The belief in historical progress goes hand in glove with political fanaticism. The possibility of a final political solution is such a right and noble end that the vilest tyrannies are able to justify their policies as the

only possible means to such ends. Nietzsche observes that the historical men do not realize how unhistorical they actually are. Whence came their standards for interpreting history? Is not their view of the historical process and progress itself a product of history? Are the historical men not always the timely men? To the extent to which they interpret history through the ideas and moral terms of their own age, they are moved by the unhistorical, that is, by their passionate attachment to their own age.

The man who is trained for the superhistorical sees no salvation in the historical process. He believes that there is a permanent, stable order that can be discovered and explained. An account can be given of the permanent human condition, of man's permanent needs.

In the same way as the hundreds of different languages correspond to the fixed types of human needs, so that one who understood these necessities could learn nothing new from all languages: so the superhistorical thinker illuminates all history of peoples and individuals from within...

His knowledge of his own needs, the most important kind of self-knowledge, allows him to speak about all other human beings. The superhistorical man thus believes in a permanent human nature. He attempts to ascend to knowledge of human being from his own being-there. The attempt to move from the particular to the universal in

the case of human nature is a manifestation of the belief in transcendence or metaphysics. Nietzsche says that this attempt to understand human being in a superhistorical way leads to a profound disenchantment with life. The attempt to give an account of the permanent human things culminates in the insight that all passion is rooted in the unhistorical. It is always the case that every action is unjust because it is never conscious of its horizon being only a horizon. The boldest of superhistorical men is willing to say to his heart that "pain and boredom are our being and the world is mud--nothing else." The superhistorical standpoint leads to a kind of wisdom but that wisdom . . . the effect of undermining the will to live. One feels nausea and disgust with life. Of what value is this wisdom if it actually harms life rather than promotes

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it? Given the tension between life and wisdom, one must choose life. For this reason Nietzsche rejects the superhistorical. The estimation of the historical by the historical man may be nothing more than an "Occidental prejudice." But we ought gladly to concede to the superhistorical its superior wisdom if we can still be sure of having more life. Perhaps Nietzsche suggests, we can still progress within the horizon of this prejudice.

Nietzsche's apparent rejection of the superhistorical is more than a little puzzling. It presents us with the following paradox: how can we reject that which Nietzsche has presented to be true? He goes so far as to call it wisdom. Does he expect us to forget the superhistorical?

One can only conclude that Nietzsche's intends to transform the superhistorical and in so doing resolve the tension between wisdom and life. The superhistorical came to light as the product of scientific Historie. Nietzsche's attack on scientific Historie cannot help but transform both the possibility and the meaning of the superhistorical.

The possibility of reconciling the opposition between life and wisdom is also suggested by the noticeable absence of any mention of the plastic strength in the discussion of the superhistorical. It is Historie that is scholarly or scientific and lacking in the plastic strength that leads to the superhistorical, as it is now understood. Nietzsche had earlier stated that there are men who have natures that are so strong they cannot be harmed by the historical sense. This suggests that for them the superhistorical would have a different meaning and significance. These men would be capable of using the superhistorical for more life and not feel the nausea that men of lesser plastic strength would feel. They are capable of creating new horizons rather than merely debunking the deeds of the past.

The starting point for our "rejection" of the superhistorical is the consideration of the opposition between life and wisdom. To leave us with no doubt about this opposition, Nietzsche presents his reader with a number of theses.

A historical phenomenon, purely and completely recognized and dissolved into a phenomenon of the cognition, is, for him who has recognized it, dead: for he has recognized in it the delusion, the injustice, the blind passion, and overall the whole earthly, dark horizon of this phenomenon and just in this its historical power. This power has become powerless for the knowing one; but not yet for him who lives.

This is the description of the superhistorical and its effect. This leads to Nietzsche's next thesis: history cannot be understood as pure scholarship or science because it would then constitute a final closing out of human accounts. The whole past would be seen as unjust and become powerless. From this follows a third thesis: Historie as a science is incapable of self-rule. It must always be ruled by a higher force, by the desire to bring about a culture. Scholarship must always be in the service of the education of the soul that is true cultivation. It is not an end in itself.

Nietzsche concludes with the following question: to what degree does life need the service of Historie at all? This is one of the highest questions and concerns of a man, a people, or a culture. An excess of Historie not only brings about the degeneration of life, it also brings about its own degeneration. The concern of Historie for itself dictates that it consider its effect on life. Historie must again consider the necessity of its being politic with its wisdom.

The Use and Abuse of Historie: Chapters Two and Three

Chapters Two and Three form a second distinct part of the essay. It is Nietzsche's argument that there are three kinds of Historie or ways of considering the past. These types are in the service of life because they are based on three kinds of needs. These needs give man a reason and a purpose for studying the past that goes beyond mere edification or idle curiosity in the service of self-forgetting. Each of the three types of Historie is to be ruled by life. None of them is self-governing, which means that the rule of life means more than the rule of particular needs. We shall attempt to shed some light on the notion of the rule of life and the possible political implications of that rule, for Nietzsche ultimately intends that the highest expression of the type man--the philosopher--rule.

Chapter Two divides into two parts--a long discussion on the use and abuses of monumental Historie and a very short digression on the degeneration caused when a man takes up the wrong kind of Historie. Chapter Three also divides into two parts--a discussion of antiquarian Historie and a much shorter discussion of critical Historie. The discussions of monumental and antiquarian Historie have almost identical four-part constructions. This naturally causes one to wonder about the relationship between the digression at the end of Chapter Two and the discussion of critical Historie at the end of Chapter

Three. We shall show that there is an important connection between the two, one which sheds light on the meaning of the rule of life.

Nietzsche begins Chapter Two by setting forth what turns out to be the plan of the second and third parts of the essay. He says he intends to prove two propositions. The first is that "life requires the service of Historie." This is the subject of Part Two, Chapters Two and Three. He goes on to say that he intends later to prove the second proposition, that "an excess of Historie is harmful to life." This he does in Chapters Four through Nine, which form Part Three of the essay. Nietzsche says that Historie belongs to the living, as opposed to the idle or decadent, in three respects. Man, insofar as he is active and striving, needs monumental Historie. One needs antiquarian Historie insofar as he preserves and admires. And one has a need for critical Historie insofar as one suffers and is in need of liberation. Each kind of Historie is a way in which life requires Historie's service.

This opening paragraph raises at the outset some interesting questions. Are these three needs rooted in man's nature or in history? Are all three present in the same man at the same time? Or are there three different kinds of men as defined by their having only one kind of need? Can men be transformed from being ruled by one kind of need to rule by another? What implications does

Nietzsche's typology of need have for political society? Does not a hierarchical order of defining needs not imply a hierarchic society or aristocratic regime? And finally, in which of these needs is philosophy rooted?

We shall examine this part of the essay with these questions in mind. For in our view Nietzsche does indeed have a teaching about the relationship between human nature and need, the hierarchy of human need, the best regime and the place of philosophy in that regime.

The Use of Monumental Historie:

History belongs above all to the active and powerful man, to him who fights a great fight, who requires models, teachers, and comforters and cannot find them among his associates and in the present.

Monumental Historie is a way of considering the past that derives from a particular reason for looking at the past. The active man is the man who feels a need for history in the form of examples of great deeds. Schiller needed history in this way because "our age is so bad that the poet cannot find a useful nature among the human lives that surround him." Polybius wrote his political history of Rome to help men overcome resignation by seeing how great men dealt with the reverses of fortune. Who Nietzsche mean by active and powerful men? His examples point to the poet and the political man. A third possibility is Polybius himself--the historian. And as

Nietzsche indicated in the preface, he includes himself-- the philosopher--as an active man. What then does Nietzsche mean by activity?

Nietzsche proceeds to contrast the active man with the idler, the man for whom Historie is a means to self-forgetting and distraction. The active man needs history to provide him with a goal and the faith that he can reach that goal. The idle man uses Historie to help him forget that he has no goal. Instead of viewing the past in a monumental way to avoid resignation, he conceives of his resignation as a virtue and thus rationalizes his inactivity. Activity always requires a goal. The highest activity may be that which discovers or creates goals because it is the activity which makes all other activity possible. Politics is the activity which sets the goals for most human beings. But politics always looks beyond itself for those goals. They are usually derived from the gods and from tradition. It is the poets and the historians who are the interpreters of both. The activity of politics is dependent upon and thus subordinate to that of the poets and historians. This does not mean that they are not dependent on something more powerful than themselves. For they are, as Nietzsche says elsewhere, "always the valets of some morality." And that morality is always the creation of some philosopher. Nietzsche pointed to this in his opening line quotation from Goethe. Goethe was there discussing Schiller's affinity for Kant.

The goal of the active man is "some happiness, often

not his own, but that of a people or all mankind." What is the reward for the man who seeks the happiness of others? Nietzsche says that most active men are beckoned by the reward of fame, a place in the temple of Historie. He suggests that for a few, there is another kind of reward, perhaps having to do with their own happiness. This suggests an important division in the four kinds of active men we have indicated. One suspects that it is only the philosopher who seeks not fame but his own happiness.

The active man lives by the following commandment. "What was once capable of magnifying the concept 'man' and of giving it a more beautiful content must be present eternally in order to be eternally possible." It is this eternal possibility that guarantees his fame and is at the bottom of his faith in monumental Historie. He does not understand himself as a historical being but as a representative of that permanent possibility for greatness that lies in man's unchanging nature.

That the greatest moments in the struggle of individuals form a chain, that in them the highpoints of mankind [Menschheit] are linked through millenia, that the highest in such a long-past moment be for me still living, bright and great--that is the fundamental thought of the belief in humanity [Humanitat], which is expressed in the demand for monumental Historie.

The active man depends upon the idea of humanitas to provide him with a horizon which directs his activity. He understands his activity to be the fulfillment of his superhistorical human nature. This belief in the superhistorical is an absolutely necessary condition for action. It provides the sacred justification for the active man's actions. For the active man almost always must destroy the order he finds himself in to fulfill that nature. He understands the highest examples of human nature to be founders, most often founders of new political orders. And a great founding has almost always been accompanied by a great destruction.

Monumental Historie, therefore, poses an obvious political problem. It undermines the present order by contrasting it with past greatness. It heightens the active man's desire to destroy the old order to make way for that which he would bring into being. Nietzsche says that the demand that greatness be eternal "kindles the most fearful battle." It is capable of bringing about the war of all against all. The great always provides a standard which devalues convention by reminding men of the gulf that separates mere life from the good or active life. It makes the active man impious and hence dangerous. There is always a struggle between the many who preserve the old order and the few who can only see the value of life in founding a new one. The few demand that greatness be eternal--that they once more illuminate human nature through their example by creating something

new, whether it be a political order, a religion, or a whole new cosmology. But all else that lives cries no, that the monumental ought not arise.

Dull habit, the small and lowly which fills all corners of the world and wafts like a dense earthly vapour around everything great, deceiving and suffocating, obstructs the path which the great must travel to immortality. Yet this path travels through human brains! Through the brains of frightened short-lived animals who repeatedly rise to the same needs and with effort fend off their destruction for a short time. For above all they want one thing: to live at any price.

Nietzsche thus distinguishes the few active and powerful men from the common man. Most men hold pleasure to be the greatest good and death the greatest evil. They will not risk their lives for fame. For the few, life is not worth living without either fame (or that happiness that Nietzsche mentioned might be the goal of a rare few of those active men). These few are always awakened by the examples of the great men of the past. For these examples show that the most splendid life is the life of the man who cares least about mere life. For him life is just a means to greatness and not something good in itself to be protected at all costs. Where the common man looks upon his short span of time with "sad seriousness", the active man looks upon it with "lofty scorn." He goes to his grave with irony because he knows that his "real being"--"a work, a deed, a rare inspiration, a creation"--cannot be buried. He believes in fame, "in the affinity and

continuity of the great of all ages." He believes there will always be natures like himself and they will always need deeds like his own to inspire them, thus guaranteeing his immortality.

Monumental Historie is an example of knowledge in the service of life. The active man learns that the great was once possible and is thus possible again. The Italian Renaissance, for example, can teach him that a whole culture was raised on the backs of just one hundred men like himself. He thus now knows that it would only take one hundred men like himself to bring culture into the modern world. This knowledge gives him a hope and faith in the future and is thus productive of new life. He now sets his sights on the rare and the classic as the goal of his own activity and engages the outstanding examples of past greatness in a contest that stands outside of history.

Truth Versus Life in Monumental Historie

Having just put forward the monumental example of the Renaissance, Nietzsche now advises the reader to pause and think about this example a second time. It reveals a problem that monumental Historie must always conceal if it is to be effective. Monumental Historie always overlooks the specificity and historical uniqueness of events in order to portray different times as analogous. It must

force the individuality of the past into general forms in order to give the past a powerful effect. According to Nietzsche, all historical phenomena are, in truth, unique. Scientific Historie is the attempt to portray the full uniqueness of each event. This results in a vivid portrayal of how all times are essentially different and why no past historical event can ever be duplicated. Scientific Historie completely undermines the effective powers of history on the active and powerful man. Monumental Historie is thus always at odds with the scientific or "truthful" account of history. The latter always portrays the essential uniqueness of the past in terms of the myriad of causes that come together in each historical event. How could this once-only complex of causes that came together to produce an effect ever be fully understood, let alone duplicated?

Nietzsche says that monumental Historie could only be truthful if there was an "eternal recurrence."

Only if the earth again and again began her drama anew after the fifth act, if it were certain that the same tangle of motives, the same deus ex machina, the same catastrophe recurred at definite intervals, should the powerful man desire monumental Historie in complete iconic truthfulness, that is, desire each fact in its precisely depicted character and uniqueness: thus probably not before astronomers become astrologers again.

Monumental Historie is not truthful because it makes numerous errors of omission. Its criterion for selection

is the effect of great and ambitious men. It overlooks most effects in order to portray one effect monumentally. History thus becomes a record of numerous "effects in themselves." It is these "effects in themselves" which the great and powerful "take to heart like an amulet." At the same time the past itself is damaged as great parts of it go unnoticed and hence are lost. Should monumental Historie come to hold sway great sections of the past will be lost and with them the chance for constructing a truthful account of history.

Nietzsche's treatment of monumental Historie is puzzling. How can monumental Historie be effective for the reader of this essay? For one cannot forget the criticism that monumental Historie falsifies the past in order to portray it monumentally. This suggests that Nietzsche has in mind some way of reconciling monumental Historie with the truth, which may not necessarily mean with the objective understanding of history that emerges from scientific Historie. It may also mean that the idea of eternal recurrence is not as absurd as one might think. Nietzsche later came to hold the idea of eternal recurrence as being one of his most important and fundamental teachings. It is his attack on scientific Historie that prepares the way for the doctrine of eternal recurrence. He will later show that scientific Historie is incapable of properly understanding the past precisely because it understands it "objectively." Scientific Historie may thus be wrong in thinking that every

historical event is essentially unique because it is this very objectivity which hides the recurring aspect to historical events--the great passion, ambition, and will to power of the active and powerful men who are the great men of history.

The Abuses of Monumental Historie

Monumental Historie can be abused in two ways. It can create an account of the past that borders on fiction and myth. Such a wonderful and splendid account could, in the hands of an evil man, be used to incite the active man to rash and evil deeds. A second kind of abuse is caused when the "inactive and weak" master monumental Historie and put it to their own use. They use monumental Historie to oppress and if possible destroy the active man. Each of these abuses points to a deficiency in monumental Historie. Together they point to the need for a ruling power that is higher and more comprehensive than monumental Historie.

Monumental Historie is always in danger of mythologizing the past because it interprets the past according to "aesthetic criteria." It looks to the past for examples of great, i.e. noble and beautiful, deeds and creations. This is not to say that it creates a wholly imaginary past. There is a limit to this aesthetic interpretation. There must still be something true in its account of the past. Some actual event must be at the bottom of it. Homer's Iliad would never have come to have the immense influence it has exercised over the West if it had been thought of by everyone as complete fantasy. The same holds true of the Platonic Socrates. Plato is no mere chronicler of the life of Socrates and we even know that his Socrates, in contrast to those of Xenophon and

Aristophanes, is a Socrates made young and beautiful. But behind this Socrates is the historical Socrates. It is the knowledge that there was a Socrates that makes the Platonic account so compelling. For one quickly forgets that Plato's Socrates is not the historical Socrates and takes heart from the "fact" that what was once possible may well be possible again.

Nietzsche poses the problem that arises when monumental Historie is in the hands of men who, unlike Homer and Plato, are less concerned to promote virtue than to promote their own political power. Imagine it in the hands of "enraptured rascals and talented egoists." They can tempt the active man to act in the service of political goals that are less than noble by drawing false and evil analogies. One need only think of the sinister eloquence of Hitler to see the truth in this. Monumental Historie needs to be guided by some notion of justice, or at least prudence, if it is not to fall prey to the base uses of evil men. Otherwise "empires are destroyed, princes murdered, wars and revolutions instigated, and the number of 'effects' in themselves...is further increased." Monumental Historie must be political history. It must teach prudence and moderation at the same time as it encourages men to strive for the noble and the great.

Monumental Historie thus poses a political problem. It is dangerous in the hands of the wrong men. But Nietzsche is even more concerned about the harm that can come to the

active and powerful should the weak and inactive master it and put it to their uses. "What harm could it not inflict?", Nietzsche asks. "Artless and feebly artistic natures" armed with a monumental history of art will use it to attack their hereditary enemies--the "strong artistic spirits." Only the latter have a need and therefore a right to a monumental history of art. Only future artists can learn the techniques and skills of the masters of the past. They use the past to teach them how they might create a future. The inactive and inartistic man uses art history to construct a canon of "good taste." From this he can identify something which he calls culture --a learned knowledge of past manners, tastes, forms, and arts. He uses this newly defined "culture" to judge all new art. All new creations which do not strike a pious pose toward history, that is towards this new canon, are condemned as unworthy. Everything admitted into this rigidified horizon of "culture" is now nothing more than imitation and decoration. In the hands of these weak and inactive men monumental Historie is turned into its opposite. Instead of promoting and nurturing the drives of the active man, it is used to stifle and kill those drives. It engenders nothing more than a kind of dilletantism that serves only to stultify the creative powers of active men.

Nietzsche's account of these two kinds of abuses of monumental Historie is an implicit attack on the political order which facilitates, if not causes, such abuses. It

is an attack on democracy. In the democratic regime, the common man has power over the active man in such a way as allows him to destroy the active man. If "the use of the popular vote and numerical majorities were transferred to the realm of art and the artist required to defend himself before a forum of the aesthetically inactive, you may bet your life he will be condemned." One need only consider Socrates' fate. Democracy uses monumental Historie in order to oppress the few. The same holds true in politics. "At all times the armchair politician has been wiser, more just and judicious, than the governing statesman." Nietzsche attributes this misuse of Historie to an instinctive "hatred of the powerful and great of their time" on the part of most men. They use the dead to bury the living and thus ensure that the monumental is not produced again.

Culture

Nietzsche concludes Chapter Two by drawing a general conclusion from the examples of the abuse of monumental Historie.

Each of the three types of Historie is right in only one soil and one climate: in every other it grows into a noxious weed. If the man who wants to create something great needs the past at all, he will seize it by way of monumental Historie: whoever, on the other hand, likes to persist in the traditional and venerable will nurse the past as an antiquarian historian: and only he who is oppressed by some present necessity and wants to throw off the burden at all costs has a need for critical that is judging and condemning Historie.

Education that provides knowledge in the service of life, that works towards cultivating the soul, requires a science of planting. One must match different kinds of souls as defined by their kinds of needs. Nietzsche has discussed them as pure types, as one must for purposes of definition. But the problem is made more complex because human beings are not pure types. Nietzsche will later use the example of Goethe as a man who possesses the gifts and some of the needs of the kind of man who needs antiquarian Historie. At the same time he has already indicated that Goethe is indeed one of the active and powerful men. How then is one to recognize these different kinds of souls and ensure that each kind does not fall victim to the "thoughtless transplanting" that produces only degeneration rather than health?

If human beings were pure types and one could recognize them at a very young age, as in the Republic's "noble lie", then an education that would prove healthy for everyone would perhaps be possible through segregation. That is apparently absurd. The only other solution is to combine all three types of Historie in such a way that each person gets what he needs, and only what he needs, from it. Every history would combine all three ways of considering the past. The man who has a need for examples of great and noble deeds would see the noble. The pious man would have his piety strengthened by examples of the greatness of his tradition that reflect well upon the present. And the man who is above all in need of liberation would perceive in this history a criticism and debunking of the present that leads him upwards to freedom.

This kind of education would involve writing history in a way that is hard for us, who live in society that holds the belief that all men were created free and equal, to take seriously. It requires an art of writing that hides much and says some things to only a few. This art was formerly more widely known and used considerably. But esoteric writing fell into disfavor and disuse with the rise of the Enlightenment. Nietzsche wishes to revive it. The exoteric or antiquarian must always promote the piety of the common man. Such piety would include instilling in him a healthy view of the distance between him and the great while at the same time comforting him

with the knowledge that he shares in the deeds of the great as an heir to them. The dangerous aspects of history must be presented esoterically. One thus prevents Historie from falling into the hands of "enraptured rascals". It prevents the uprooting of the piety of the common man by critical Historie and the abuses of monumental Historie that lead to connoisseurs of the great who lack the ability of the great.

Nietzsche says elsewhere that this is the way Thucydides wrote his history of the war between Athens and Sparta. An even clearer example emerges in the history of Socrates that comes down to us from Plato. The Platonic dialogues are a presentation of a Socrates made young and beautiful. If one is awakened from one's comfortable sleep in the course of reading the dialogues, it is usually by the noble image of Socrates and philosophy that first emerges from the dialogues. Only a few are ever really captured by this noble vision of philosophy. And even fewer ever come to see that beneath this beautiful exterior is a Socrates that is far from the noble and manly image that first comes to sight. Almost all active men would, for example, find the idea that philosophy is unmanly repulsive. And yet Socrates does indeed make suggestions in that regard.

Nietzsche's account of the proper education suggests that the educator must be a physician of culture, a master at the art of planting the right kind souls. He must

understand the different kinds of needs that are manifest in the soul. This can only be done by considering pure types. He must also learn the art of planting given that human beings possess souls that are not pure types. The historian must be one who knows all three types and can recognize them in his audience. He knows how to write for an audience that is at the same time three different audiences. This physician of culture is none other than the political philosopher. It is political philosophy that combines the knowledge of souls and the art of writing to promote the political health of a society at the same time as it promotes the health of philosophy.

The Use of Antiquarian Historie

Nietzsche's digression on culture is now followed by an analysis of the need that is always in danger of corrupting and being corrupted by monumental Historie. History belongs above all to the active and powerful man. "In the second place, then, history belongs to the preserving and revering soul--to him who with loyalty and love looks back to that place from where he came." Through his piety he confirms the value of, and gives thanks for, his "being-there." The tradition gives his life value and meaning. He thus aims to preserve that tradition and in so doing preserve the conditions that ensure the next generation will also have a solid and unbroken horizon.

The old and decayed is elevated to the divine and sacred through antiquarian Historie. They form a tradition which has in the eyes of the antiquarian historian, an eternal spirit that lives across the ages. It is this spirit which is manifest and captured in the tradition that is his horizon.

Antiquarian Historie instills one with the instinct to recognize the spirit of one's own people across the ages. It was this gift, he says, that allowed Goethe to recognize the German soul in the architecture of the Strassbourg cathedral built centuries before by Erwin von Steinbach. It was the same gift that enabled the active men of the Renaissance to see the soul of their people across the ages in Rome. But the "most valuable" use of antiquarian Historie is not for the active man but its ability to imbue "modest, coarse, even wretched conditions in which a man or a people live with a simple touching feeling of pleasure and contentment." This, says Nietzsche, is the real historical sense. It promotes loyalty and piety and prevents a restless cosmopolitanism and longing for novelty.

How could Historie serve life better than by tying even less favoured generations and populations to their homelands and its customs, by making them sedentary and preventing their searching and contentiously fighting for something better in foreign lands.

It may be stubbornness and unreason that ties people to their habits and ways, but it is a healthy stubbornness, says Nietzsche. For the consequences of the urge for novelty and the loss of piety are terrible. The conditions for revolution and for the disintegration of a people are created and almost always taken advantage of. Antiquarian Historie provides one with "the happiness of knowing oneself not to be wholly arbitrary and accidental...to be justified in one's existence (Existenz).". It allows one to understand the world superhistorically. For the "conservative" man sees himself as an expression of a spirit that is eternal and not as a product of history.

Antiquarian Historie and the Truth

Antiquarian Historie, like monumental, does not find complete truthfulness to its advantage. For the truth about the origins of any political order and culture are usually shrouded in a healthy mist. The conserving and revering soul needs antiquarian Historie both to teach and reaffirm his belief that he is the heir to a great and just tradition. To call that tradition into question is to call everything that gives his life value and meaning into question. He seeks to conserve the past by protecting it from criticism. He thus elevates the present because he understands it to be the rightful heir of a noble past. Since he does not believe that good could come from its opposite, the past is held to be simply good.

It is this drive to preserve a noble past in order to have a great and noble present that is the motive force behind antiquarian Historie. Since it views the past uncritically, it has no standard of value except what is old and its own. The antiquarian historian "takes everything to be equally important and therefore each individual thing to be too important." He perceives no differences in value and thus cannot do justice to the past. Once again, as in the case of monumental Historie, "the past itself suffers as long as Historie serves life and is ruled by life's drives."

Antiquarian Historie preserves the great deeds of the past but for a different reason and hence in a different form than monumental Historie. It misunderstands the deeds of active men because it fails to see that the motivation behind such deeds is the desire to create something new. It is the will and desire to be a founder that separates these few from the common man. Antiquarian Historie is the Historie of the common man. It provides the basis for political community by giving all men a venerable and righteous tradition to guide their lives and form their tastes.

The Abuses of Antiquarian Historie

Antiquarian Historie, like monumental Historie, can be abused in two ways. It is always in danger of degenerating into a simple reverence for everything old, thus losing its foundation which is the inspiration of the present. There is also the opposite danger of its becoming too powerful and thus overwhelming the other ways of considering the past. Antiquarian Historie, like monumental, must not be allowed to rule itself.

The degeneration of antiquarian Historie occurs when it manages to construct a canon of culture from the past. It thus has a narrow and powerful standard to measure the piety and veneration individuals pay to that past.

"Whatever does not approach the old with veneration, that is, the new and becoming, will be rejected and treated

with hostility." The historical sense in this case has hardened to the point where it no longer preserves life but mummifies it. And at the moment that the fresh life of the present no longer inspires and animates it, antiquarian Historie itself degenerates. For the piety that lies at the heart of antiquarian Historie is inspired by present life. The great pride that people feel for a musical tradition, for example, is animated by the presence of great composers in the present who add to that tradition. When that present life is no longer tolerated but condemned because it wishes to create something new rather than simply preserve the old, then the source of the antiquarian's piety withers. Without that piety, says Nietzsche, there is mere scholarly habit, a blind lust for collecting, and an insatiable craving for novelty that is satisfied by means of a historical carnival of customs, morals, and art.

Beside the danger of degeneration, there is always the danger that antiquarian Historie will become too powerful and overgrow the other ways of considering the past. "It merely understands how to preserve life and not how to beget it." The reverent and conservative soul has no instinct for discerning the significance and hence importance of that which is only just coming into being. Monumental Historie has this instinct because the active man understands from his own experience and discerns in history the desire to create something wholly new and

original. Antiquarian Historie "hinders the powerful resolve for new life." It can paralyze the active man. For he must always injure some piety because he always works to destroy the old in order to bring something new. His standard is always "that which ought to be" and as such he always devalues and condemns "that which is."

Nietzsche brings to light the permanent tension between monumental and antiquarian Historie. There is a conflict between the needs and drives of the few active men and those of the common man. How is the drive to create and found something new to be reconciled with the pious needs of the common man? How are the active man and the tradition to be reconciled? Nietzsche suggests that this need for something to mediate this struggle gives rise to a third type of Historie--critical Historie. It helps to decide this struggle and it decides it in favour of life, which is to say in favour of the active man. For the mass of men must depend on a rare few to keep alive their tradition by adding to it. It must always be the unknowing goal of a society to promote the few great examples of what it means to be human. For those expressions of greatness are always in the common good. They preserve the piety and hence the horizon which alone makes life possible. They must always express themselves as fulfilling the law and not destroying it, which is to say as heirs and inheritors of the tradition and not radical departures from it. This means they must always be politic in their actions. Otherwise they will destroy

the tradition to which they aspire to contribute, and hence the very basis of political life. Critical Historie must therefore be extremely politic. It must decide the conflict between piety and the desire to create something new and great in favour of life by only destroying the piety of the few.

Critical Historie

The abuses of the first two types of Historie make clear the need for a third. Nietzsche calls it critical Historie because it serves life by criticizing the past and thus freeing one from it. It serves the need of the active and powerful man to be liberated from the oppression of the past in the form of his piety towards the present. Every past can justly be condemned, says Nietzsche, because human violence and weakness have always been a part of every historical event. But it is not justice that sits in judgment of the past. It is life. In most cases, their verdicts would be the same. The times they are not is when life decides that a particular past ought not be condemned. Life decides on the basis of the past's usefulness in promoting life and not its truthfulness. There is thus an apparent tension between justice, which demands "the whole truth and nothing but the truth" and life, "that dark, driving, insatiably self-desiring power."

Nietzsche says that it takes a great deal of strength to be able "to live and to forget insofar as life and injustice are one and the same thing." It would take even greater strength to be able to live always remembering this. A people is united and defined by their faith in the justness of their way of life. They ought not be reminded that their way of life emerged under the most questionable conditions, perhaps as the result of the destruction of some other people, and that the great men of their tradition were really "only human," which in our time has come to mean as ordinary and vicious as everyman. Nor do they need to be reminded that their laws are inconsistent and that what their highest court said was just at the start of the century is unjust at the end.

But now and then the same life that demands forgetting demands the temporary annihilation of forgetting; then it should become clear how unjust the existence of something is, e.g., a privilege, a caste, a dynasty, how much this thing deserves to be brought down. Then its past is considered critically, one takes the knife to its roots, then one cruelly treads all pieties under foot.

Life demands that the active and powerful should remember the injustice of the past. They are thus freed from their pious illusions about that past and from the abuses of monumental and antiquarian Historie when they are turned against the active man.

Critical Historie is always extremely dangerous. It is politically dangerous in that it can uproot a whole

tradition and destroy the very basis of political community. But Nietzsche seems more concerned with the health of the individual who takes up critical Historie than with the political consequences. Such men are always "endangered and dangerous men." For there is no limit to this process of digging up and condemning the past, as our modern social science shows. Men can, by annihilating the past, end up annihilating themselves. Critical Historie is destructive and nihilistic. The only issue is whether this nihilism is to make way for a powerful new horizon or is merely the destruction of the old for the sake of a truthful account of history. Nietzsche says that it is meant only for those few who need it in order to allow them the freedom to create something new.

Even though we may condemn the past, we remain its heirs and descendants. "We may condemn their aberrations, passions, errors, even crimes and thus deem ourselves released from them, but we are still descended from them." Thus, it "is impossible to completely free oneself from this chain." The critical historian cannot claim to be free from those errors if his standard of criticism is a product of those same errors. It is thus impossible to gain a truly superhistorical standpoint by way of critical Historie. As Nietzsche said in Chapter One, this results only in a kind of nausea and disgust with life.

Critical Historie most often leads to nihilism and the cynical view that since everything is of equal worth, nothing is of any worth. In the case of the pious and

reverent soul, critical Historie only succeeds in making him worse. For most men it reduces their outlook on the world to the basest and lowest form of "moral" thinking--egoism. Nietzsche goes on to demonstrate how Historie can bring on a process of degeneration in the following chapters. He considers the best case of the use of critical Historie--nihilism is in the service of life.

In the best case we bring the inherited, innate nature and our cognition into conflict, as well as a new, strong discipline and an older raising and breeding into struggle, we plant a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that the first nature withers away. It is an attempt to give oneself a past a posteriori, so to speak, from which one would like to be descended, in opposition to that from which one is descended: always a dangerous attempt...

This is what Nietzsche understands as knowledge in the service of life. The best education involves Historie that is truthful but does not seek the truth for its own sake. It seeks the truth in order to provide the basis for a new and improved nature. What guides critical Historie and ensures that only those who have the need to be liberated become critical historians? It must not only identify the proper men but also ensure that it speaks only to those few men. Critical Historie is not autonomous. It too needs the rule of something higher. But critical Historie is obviously closer to that higher ruling power than is either monumental or antiquarian. This higher power is political philosophy. Nietzsche is

suggesting that critical Historie is a fundamental part of philosophy, but only a part. Philosophy also involves the knowledge of nature and not just history. Nietzsche points to this in his short digression at the end of Chapter Two. The knowledge of different kinds of needs and drives that are fundamental to human nature do not come from any of the three types of Historie. It is the reverse. The three types of Historie are based on the knowledge provided by philosophy. For the attempt to give oneself a new nature is an attempt to rid oneself of opinion and replace it with knowledge about what the good for human beings is. It is an attempt to know what is good by nature as opposed to what is thought good by opinion. Nietzsche gives some suggestion as to what he thinks the standard by which one judges natures is. Only in a few cases is the second nature stronger than the first. What gives this second nature its superior strength? Nietzsche is arguing that it is knowledge about the good. It is knowledge of justice, for justice is the knowledge of the good, both common and private. The man with a superior second nature is the man who has succeeded in becoming more just and hence stronger. For it is surely the case that what is good for man makes him stronger. And it is justice to get what is good.

Nietzsche's typology of needs suggests a clear hierarchy. He distinguishes between the few and the many on the basis of their desire and strength to act. Most

men are not active men and they need the comfort that comes from "knowing" that things cannot be different than they are. This is what antiquarian Historie teaches them --the overwhelming necessity of their fate. It allows them to embrace that fate lovingly. The active and powerful man is always dissatisfied with the present because he desires to act. He desires more than what he has. It is this overwhelming desire for more, a desire for life, which Nietzsche describes as a desire for power, that distinguishes the active and powerful man. The strength of his will to power pushes him in a search for the good. Nietzsche argues that this can only lead to a terrible conflict between the many and the few, between piety which supports inertia and the devaluation of the present through both monumental and critical Historie, which always works to heighten the active man's will to power. This struggle is not only between, but also within, men. For the active man can indeed be a pious man. It is this piety that gives rise to critical Historie and to the struggle that culminates in the planting of a stronger and more healthy second nature.

Nietzsche's discussion of the three types of Historie suggests that the typology of need is based on a typology of men. He divides men into the few active and powerful and the many or common who are fundamentally pious and conserving men. The need for critical Historie emerges from the struggle between and within men. For men are not pure types and the active and powerful will always have

certain pieties which at times hold them back and oppress them. It is clear from Nietzsche's discussion that the three types of Historie can only work if they are accompanied by an art of writing that ensures that each type of Historie is taken up by the right kind of soul. And it also seems apparent upon reflection that there must be some overseer to the planting of souls. All of this seems to suggest that Nietzsche has in mind a political order that is ruled by the true physicians of culture--political philosophers. This need not mean that they must hold political office. But Nietzsche's political intention is to revive and make strong the distinction between the few and the many. His hierarchy of human needs gives rise to a definite political hierarchy. Philosophy is at the peak of this hierarchy. It is rooted in the need to feel an ever-growing sense of life or power. This feeling comes from an ever-growing sense of the feeling of distance that the philosopher feels towards other men and his times. He slowly transforms himself by reflecting on his true needs and letting the sham ones die out. It is this reflection that gives him alone a view of the whole of human needs and their hierarchical order. Only the philosopher knows how Historie must be practiced. And only the political philosopher knows how history must be presented. The best regime is thus an aristocracy--the rule of the best--the rule of philosophy.

Scientific Historie and the Degeneration of the Soul:

Chapters Four through Nine.

Chapter Four is a discussion of how the "natural relation between Historie and life" is altered by the demand that Historie be scientific. It gives rise to historical cultivation and the antiquarianism that Nietzsche has just described in the previous section as being capable of destroying life. It causes an excess of Historie and thus gives rise to historicism by historicizing all aspects of life. Chapters Five through Nine are a description of the calamitous effects of historicism. Each chapter describes a particular effect. This description culminates in Nietzsche's vivid portrayal of the political and moral effects of historicism. He gives a history of the degeneration of man into the kind who believes he stands at the end and peak of world history--the last man. Nietzsche argues that this type may indeed be the last man because he may very well succeed in making any further elevation of the type man impossible. There will no longer be any need for genius or greatness but only "sterling mediocrity."

The commentary will focus on only two aspects of this part of the essay. It will examine Nietzsche's account of how the demand that Historie be scientific gives rise to historicism. It will then trace the history of the degeneration of the soul that culminates in the appearance of the last man. We shall try to make clear the political

and social order of the last man and the "morality" of egoism that belongs with that new order.

Scientific Historie and Historicism

Nietzsche begins Chapter Four with a summary that is meant to remind us of and clarify the natural relation between Historie and life. Men need Historie but this need takes different forms and hence so must Historie. This precludes from the outset that there could be one type of Historie for all men. We never need Historie "like individuals hungry for knowledge, satisfied with mere knowledge, [and] whose only goal is the increase of recognition." Historie is not for the purpose of knowing simply but "always for the purpose of life and therefore always under the rule and highest direction of that purpose." It must always be for the purpose of knowing in the service of those needs and drives that give rise to the three types of Historie. It is the rule of the purpose of life which makes the relation between life and Historie a natural one. Life is the natural born ruler of Historie. When knowledge is no longer in the service of life, when Historie becomes scientific, then the natural relation between life and Historie is destroyed. Both life and Historie degenerate as a result.

Nietzsche does not mean to suggest that the natural relation means that reason is in the service of the

passions. This could very well be man's original condition, but it is not his natural one. Nietzsche means the perfection of human nature when he uses 'natural' to describe the human condition. What is natural is what makes man more powerful, i.e., gives him more life. He becomes more natural as he becomes more healthy. The natural is what promotes health and hence the perfection of human nature. It thus gives rise to the notion of right to which he has been appealing in his essay. What is right by nature is that which leads to the increased health and perfection of that nature, to more life. Natural right, in Nietzsche's view, is what justifies and governs the search for knowledge and hence Historie. What is right by nature is the increase of life or power. Knowledge must always be in the service of this search. Otherwise it becomes superfluous and actually works against life.

Nietzsche's description of the natural and hence right relation between life and Historie is intended to provide the basis for a judgment about our own time. This relation has now become "unclear, unnatural and confused." The constellation between life and Historie has been altered by science and the demand that Historie be a science. "[L]ife is no longer the sole ruler and master of the past." Each of the three types of Historie know some limit to their inquiries. They do not strive for complete truthfulness or else; in the case of critical Historie, it does not annihilate the past without being

guided by philosophy which always has the dangers, both political and ethical, in view. Scientific Historie knows no limits nor sees no dangers to its pursuit of the whole truth about the past. It thus reveals, for all to see, universal human history which is truly a "boundless spectacle." "All perspectives have shifted as far back as the origins of change, back into infinity." Now we know that all human thought is historical. It is a matter of perspective, and that perspective is merely the view from within a certain historical horizon. All horizons are human creations and there is thus no permanent, right perspective for man as man. There is no standard outside of history which one can discover and thus measure the true value of things; there are only values, all of which are of equal value. Scientific Historie leads to historicism and ultimately nihilism. For if all values are of equal value, then none would seem to be of any special value, such as would justify one's being ruled by it.

There is a logical fallacy involved in the reasoning that because history reveals a wide variety of transitory and everchanging ideas, all thought is historical. History reveals the rise and fall of numerous civilizations, each with their own way of life and values. We often tend to conclude wrongly that the variety of values means that there is no standard by which to measure all values. But the mere spectacle of a variety of values

in no way disproves that some values might be better than others. The fact that civilizations decline also does not prove that their way of life was not superior to all others, unless we make the longevity or mere life of a civilization the criterion for assessing its values. Scientific Historie does not lead logically to historicism. But this poses an interesting psychological problem. Why do we tend to reason falsely in the presence of the historical spectacle that scientific Historie reveals to us?

Nietzsche turns to examine this psychological problem and tells the reader to picture the spiritual events brought on by historicism in the soul of modern man.

Historical knowledge floods in never anew from inexhaustible springs, the alien and disconnected throngs about, the memory opens all its gates and is still not opened wide enough, nature makes a supreme effort to receive these alien guests, to order and to honour them but these themselves are at war with each other and it appears necessary to master and overcome them all so as not to perish in their strife. Gradually it becomes second nature to get accustomed to such a disorderly, stormy, belligerent household, while at the same time it is beyond question that this second nature is much weaker, much more troubled and through and through less healthy than the first.

Scientific Historie overwhelms us with the variety of the human record because we are forced to compare and judge all other ways of life or cultures in relation to our own. At the same time we are reminded of the transitory character of all standards of judgment. The sheer number

of house guests is enough to overwhelm us, Nietzsche says, but at the same time we lose all confidence in our ability and authority to order these guests. These guests or spokesmen for different ways of life are always men of the greatest ability and artistic powers. Modern man must now master and overcome the arguments of all these spokesmen from Homer and Hesiod down to Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. It is no wonder he suffers from an unparalleled case of indigestion. He cannot digest one thing because he fills himself with everything. Every great historical event, whether it be a book, a work of art, or an important deed on the battlefield--none of these has any deep or lasting impact on modern man because it has no effect on him. Only those things we can digest are taken on as nourishment, and so history provides no nourishment for modern man. Scientific Historie resembles critical in that it destroys our original or first nature and replaces it with a second one. But this second nature is weak and ineffectual because we are filled with historical events like "indigestible knowledge stones." We no longer see that it might take a life-time to digest even one great historical event like Socrates. In in so doing, one would be guaranteed of giving oneself a stronger and more healthy second nature, rather than the weak and passionless nature implanted by historical education.

Modern historical cultivation succeeds in turning men into walking encyclopedias and "manuals of internal

cultivation for external barbarians." It is knowledge taken without hunger or genuine need and hence does not act as "a transforming motive impelling to action." It thus remains hidden in a "chaotic inner world" which modern man likes to call his culture or his real self. The problem is were this inner self to disappear one could never notice it. We fill ourselves with the alien morals, arts, philosophies, and religions of the ages, none of which has any effect on our actions. Instead modern man acts almost completely according to convention because his personality is so weak and chaotic that it cannot give rise to action. It presents no coherent set of feelings and longings for life. We have no unity to our tastes or sentiments because we have no personality, which is to say that we have no inner self that is strong enough to give rise to action. We have instead become barbarians, Nietzsche says, because we are incapable of taking serious things seriously. We no longer even take history seriously because it is impossible to reconcile all the contradictory and hostile arguments that history presents to our own way of life. The only way modern man can survive this battle is to refuse to take any of his historical guests seriously. He is thus no longer the heir and inheritor of great and classical powers. He has become a museum keeper--one who searches restlessly for new sights and sounds in the dust bins of history.

Nietzsche turns to examine the Germans and their claim to have a culture. He shows that the Germans suffer more

than any other people from the effects of historicism. They already show signs of degenerating into the last man. The split between the inner and outer selves has already come to pass as a result of historicism's effect on German cultivation. The Germans have already begun to feel abstractly rather than with feelings that come naturally from their own souls. They now look to history and ask how they ought to feel about any particular thing because they have lost all faith that their own German standard and horizon is just and right.

The History of the Last Man

In Chapter Five Nietzsche resumes his analysis of the split between the inner and outer self and the consequential weak personality of modern man. Chapter Six and following is a step-by-step analysis of the degeneration of the soul or psyche. The intention of this psychology of the last man is to inspire a hatred for modern education and the notions of culture and health that are at the bottom of this education. Nietzsche hopes that his deep knowledge of the painful spectacle of modernity can implant in the reader a need to be rid of this modern education at all costs. He hopes that the reader will long and strive for "the unity of spirit and life" that characterizes all true culture.

Chapter Five continues Nietzsche's analysis of how historicism destroys one's natural instincts by uprooting our first inherited nature and replacing it with a second weaker one. It transforms us into "downright abstractis and shadows." Today all men wear masks and imitate roles as set down by sloppy and haphazard conventions. One is thus an educated man, a scholar, a poet, a philosopher, or a politician. But one is above all bourgeois (bürgerliche). History no longer encourages men to be honest but today gives them the means to be dishonest. For one needs only become learned in the history of poetry or philosophy to teach it in a university and thus call oneself a poet or philosopher. "Historical cultivation and the universal frock of the bourgeois rule at the same time." How is one to recover from the emptying of the soul by historicism? Nietzsche says that philosophy, "that honest naked goddess," "the most truthful of all the sciences", is the only means to the recovery of that honesty that modern man so much lacks. But philosophy has become the history of philosophy. Men no longer obey the commandment of philosophy--to live according to the truth. Instead philosophy has become a learned monologue of a solitary walker or, what is much more common, "harmless gossip of academic old men and children." Modern philosophy has become decrepit--limited to learned appearance. "One does think, write, teach, print philosophically--all this is more or less permitted." But one no longer takes philosophy seriously as a way of life.

With the decline of philosophy, we have lost sight of that permanent "inner human costume" or human nature. Modern philosophy is all historical and theoretical. It no longer even believes in the inner human costume. The eternal philosophical commandment to "know thyself" no longer has any meaning. Nietzsche thus turns away from modern philosophy as a possible friend in the attempt to halt the degeneration brought on by historicism. For the modern "philosophers" only prove once more that "only strong personalities can endure history; the weak are extinguished by it." Modern "philosophers" are indistinguishable from scholars. They are another form of scholar, differentiated only by their area of study and not by their methods or their souls. Historical scholarship gives rise to a uniform class of intellectual labourers or scholars. They are today referred to as social scientists. They share a common method, which they call scientific method, that is based on the doctrine of objectivity. Nietzsche says that objectivity is merely a description for the dispassionate condition that results from the emptying of the personality by historical education. What objectivity really means is that there is absolutely no connection between the subject and the object. There is thus no congruence between the scholar and the past he studies. Nietzsche describes the scholar as

Historicism undercuts his ability to feel a strong passion towards anything because he no longer believes that anything could be worth his unqualified

love. Yet this new-found objectivity or non-subjectivity makes it impossible for the scholar to understand the actions that history records. For all those actions were possible only because the actors lived within a solid and closed horizon and thus had an unqualified love for the idea and the goal that was the driving force behind them. Objective scholarship is incapable of understanding the deeds of the men who made history the way they understood those deeds. Objective history is not truthful history. Truthful history could be written only by men who understood the past the way the men who created that past understood it. Otherwise the motive and hence the cause of history will remain obscure.

The modern notion of objectivity is a consequence of historicism. We believe that it is the consequence of our heightened desire for justice. For the modern view is that objective history is just history. Nietzsche shows that we have here reversed cause and effect. We are already objective men and it is as a justification or rationalization for our objectivity, which is a weakness and not a strength, that we turn to praising our virtue of justice. Justice is the rationalization and not the reason for our objectivity.

The notion of justice that informs this belief is nothing more than the conventional views of our age raised to a doctrine under the guise of being scientific. It is a combination of scientific value relativism combined with

egalitarianism.

Those naive historians call measuring past opinions and deeds by the common opinions of the moment "objectivity": here they find the canon of all their truths; their work is to make the past fit the triviality of their time.

We have completely lost sight of the true understanding of justice as strength. "Only superior strength can judge." We instead make a virtue out of our necessary weakness. The argument of Chapter Six is that few have the pure will to be just and of them only a rare few have the strength to be. Nietzsche says that it is this will to be just which makes the striving after the truth something great. A man who has the drive and the strength for justice does not want the truth as a kind of cold knowledge without consequences but as the "sacred justification to shift all boundary markers." Few men have the will or the strength to be just--to live according to the truth.

There are all sorts of other drives besides the desire for justice that give rise to a striving for the truth. Curiosity, boredom, playfulness, envy, vanity, and Christian piety all come to mind as possibilities. Nietzsche argues that these all have much more to do with the modern notion of the pursuit of the truth than the desire of modern men to be just. Our notion of historical justice or critical scholarship is the result of our complete lack of understanding of the true relationship

between the will for justice and the desire for the truth. In Chapter Seven Nietzsche discusses the disastrous consequences of critical or "just".and objective scholarship. Scientific Historie does not understand that historical justice "always undermines the living and brings it to ruin: its judging is always annihilating." It always brings to light much that is false, crude, inhuman, absurd, and violent in past deeds and events. It thus undermines that "unconditional faith in something perfect and righteous."

The superstition that we are more just than any other people in history because we are objective leads to critical scholarship which is profoundly nihilistic. What effect can the music of Mozart have, Nietzsche asks, once he has been dragged through the mud in numerous learned, truthful or "critical" biographies. Nietzsche believes that the public has a right not to know the truth about such things. Christianity is likewise being tortured unto death by historicism. The political consequences of God's death will be monumental, says Nietzsche.

Modern scholarship, in its effort to be just and to enlighten, uproots every belief in a great and noble deed or event of the past. It destroys our attempts to form a horizon from an interpretation of the past. "Ours is not to be an age of finished, ripe, and harmonious personalities but of common, maximally useful labour." Every man will be trained "to labour in the factory of

common utility." Liberal education will be replaced by training in social science or scholarship. The scholar, unlike the liberally educated man, is immediately useful and his labours will be supervised and rewarded by the state. He becomes the peak of education in modernity, which thus reveals that there is no peak.

The education of the scholar does not implant a strong feeling of need in him but kills all feelings. It makes him a relativist and intellectual nihilist, albeit not a practical one. For he is almost always a democrat. He becomes homeless and doubts all customs and concepts. "Now he knows it: things were different in all ages, it does not matter how you are." He comes to believe that we live in an age that has no future. The only guide for action is self-interest and utility. Nietzsche says that it is this view that lies behind our belief in the end of history.

There is thus an inkling among some of the higher types of men that our age has no cause for rejoicing. They have an "obscure inkling" of our error, and an ironical self-consciousness that we live in a kind of twilight age of history. In them is "a consciousness, often subdued to the point of general skepticism, of how great is the absurdity and superstition that the education of a people must be predominantly historical as it is now." Yet they would also say that it is a fitting absurdity for our age. We live in the "old age of mankind" and it is only right that we should spend our

time like old men, reckoning up our accounts.

Nietzsche locates the cause of this belief in the old age of mankind in Christianity and not from empirical evidence collected and put forth by Historie. For there is no proof that we live in the old age of mankind. The span of time that universal history covers is so short that it is inconceivable that all the human possibilities have been exhausted.

Of what account are a couple of millenia after all (or expressed differently: the period of 34 consecutive lives of men calculated at 60 years each) that at the beginning of such a time we can still speak of a "youth" and at the end of it already of an "old age" of mankind!

Nietzsche locates the source of this belief in an already withering mankind: in the misunderstanding inherited from the Middle Ages, of a Christian theological conception, the thought that God's final judgment is upon us and that the end of the world is near. It is this conception that appears in a different guise through our "heightened historical need to judge" even though this judgment was not to be made by men. Our age now feels itself qualified to conduct the final judgment on the whole of the past. This judgment brings with it a deep feeling of hopelessness and surrounds us with a melancholy darkness. For life in the modern world is thought to be like being condemned to live in the fifth act of a tragedy. Men have come to view themselves as feeble and pale late arrivals

on the world historical stage--as epigoni to the great ages and men of the past. They are no longer able to use Historie for life because they have no hopes for the future. For only coming life can justify their present lives, and there is no coming life.

Historicism can culminate in an ironical self-consciousness that has the effect of fostering a sort of painful modesty about modernity. Nietzsche suggests that this self-consciousness on the part of a few higher types could be a way out of this degeneration. They can see that while our age is superior in historical knowledge to all others, it is at the same time inferior to the life of all other ages. One could very well begin here to reflect, the way Nietzsche did, on the problem of the struggle between knowledge and life.

Nietzsche concludes his discussion of the historical consciousness in Chapter Eight with a discussion of the degeneration of irony into cynicism. Most men do not have the strength to bear this ironical self-consciousness that modern man has no reason to rejoice about his historical superiority. What if these "antiquarian late-arrivals" were suddenly to exchange that painful modesty for shamelessness?

Let us think of them as with shrill voices they proclaim: the race is at its height, for only now does it know itself and has become revealed to itself...

This is the effect of Hegelian philosophy, says Nietzsche. There is nothing dangerous in modern cultivation that is not made even more dangerous by the influence of this philosophy. For the belief that we are late arrivals and epigoni is indeed paralyzing. Yet Hegelian philosophy makes this belief even more terrible and destructive through a bold inversion. It deifies this late arrival as the true meaning and purpose of the historical process. The knowing misery of modern man is thus understood to be the culmination of world-history.

Nietzsche traces the political and moral effects of this belief in Chapter Nine. He pictures a coming world-state because, as both Hegel and Marx believe, the state has a special mission. It is to bring about the universal homogeneous society. Nietzsche describes its mission as founding a world-system of egoism. The state "is to be the patron of all prudent egoisms, in order with its military and police force, to guard against all imprudent egoism." At the same time it is declared that "genius is no longer necessary" because we have advanced beyond the age where only a few could be geniuses. In the new order of the coming age every worker, which is to say all men, "lease a comfortable life with a work day which leaves sufficient time to cultivate his intellect." It will be an age of "sterling mediocrity" which decrees that every man will be an artist, poet, philosopher and worker at one and the same time. It holds the masses in the highest esteem because it "knows" that the great men of history

were really only the spokesmen and representatives of their time while the true representatives were the masses themselves. All coming history will thus be written from below, that is, from the perspective of the masses.

Nietzsche hints at the trouble that faces this new order, which is the problem that plagues all present-day communist regimes. It must constantly "guard against all imprudent egoism." The active and powerful man is always one who is a fighter against his age and not a representative of it. He thus always acts imprudently. He is willing to risk his own life for glory or justice. What could be more imprudent from the perspective of egoism than risking one's life? What will be the future of the active and powerful man in the new order? Nietzsche suggests that the new order will work to ensure the actual equality of all men by force. It will be the rule of the many weak over the few strong, of the worst men over the best, and thus a wholly unjust regime.

The new political order is to be founded on the morality of egoism (if that is not a contradiction in terms). It is a doctrine of self-interest understood in the lowest possible terms.

It is certainly the hour of a great danger: men seem to be near to discovering that egoism of individuals, of groups or of the masses has at all times been the lever of historical movements; at the same time, however, one is in no way troubled by this discovery, but rather decrees: let egoism be our god.

Modern man will be raised on this new doctrine of prudent egoism. His objective and thus critical history of the past will show how the present is superior to the past by virtue of its superior prudence. The coming age--the age of the last man--is the hour of great danger for man because it could quite possibly destroy the true purpose of all society. Nietzsche says that this purpose is genius. It is in the cultivation of the highest examples of what it means to be human. Modernity is close to creating the political and moral conditions that ensure that great men can never come into being. The idea that we are the peak and end of all history allows us to justify all our habits, desires, and tastes. Modern man has thus lost any standard of good and evil other than that which promotes and ensures a comfortable existence. He has no reason to be ashamed for anything he thinks or does. His shamelessness goes well with his belief in egalitarianism because he need feel no qualms about any desire as long as it is a normal, i.e., common, desire.

This shameless and selfish type of "man" of the future is to be prized as the end of world history. Nietzsche says that history is not a tragedy, as we now like to think, but a comedy. What could be funnier than the idea that the goal of the historical process is modern man?

Overcoming Historicism: Chapter Ten.

The fourth and final part of the essay is Nietzsche's attempt to provide us with a cure for the historical disease. His presentation is sketchy and somewhat Delphic, but deliberately so, as he makes clear in the antepenultimate paragraph. Youth must be properly educated, which means "education in the service of life." The goal of this new education is to found a Culture (Kultur). For only within a Culture can there be culture. This will require both the liberation and the healing of those decadent souls that are degenerating under contemporary education. The first step in bringing about "education in the service of life" is the destruction of modern education. Only then will modern man begin to feel a genuine need for culture.

This new education requires a whole new understanding of culture. Culture, properly understood, will require the destruction of all modern notions of education, because these are based on a false notion of culture. This liberation from our timely views on education must be accompanied by the healing of "life's plastic strength." The first generation and precursors to a new Culture will need an education that will enable them to make a wholesale and radical criticism of, and thus annihilate, those timely views. This levelling of opinion reopens the question of what are the genuine human necessities. Culture is fulfilling that hierarchy of human necessities.

To complement the nihilism of this first generation which makes a new beginning possible, there must be men who come after who know what a Culture is and how to found one. Nietzsche says that one can best learn this by turning to the Greeks. Through a return to the Greeks we can begin a-
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 new and found a genuine culture of our own.

Nietzsche begins the final chapter by exclaiming that in thinking about youth he has sighted land. "Now a coastline is in sight: whatever it may be like we must land there, and the worst harbor of refuge is better than to stagger back into hopeless, skeptical infinity." This harbor may be a poor one, Nietzsche says, but we can land here and later find better ones for those who will come after.

Historicism casts us upon what Nietzsche earlier called an "infinite sea of becoming." Without some permanent bearings and standards, life has no meaning and human beings collapse into cynical egoism and ultimately nihilistic skepticism. Nietzsche says that he has sighted a new continent, a way out of historicism. Once upon land, man will again be able to live within stable, secure horizons. The first harbors may indeed be rocky and barren but we can at least go ashore and begin to seek out better ones. By this Nietzsche indicates that he is no relativist. These harbors will provide us with secure horizons. Some are better than others. Some cultures are better than others.

What is the standard for measuring the value of a Culture? What makes some harbors better than others? The metaphor of the harbor provides some interesting clues. A good harbor is one which provides safety from storms, easy access, and perhaps all those things that would make a return to the sea-faring life unnecessary and undesirable. A good Culture is one which holds men at home and keeps moral skepticism out of the picture. Men remain secure in their belief in what is noble and just, in their righteous faith that their way of life is the best.

To ask the question of what is culture, or what is the standard which one uses to measure and evaluate horizons, is to ask the fundamental question of political philosophy: what is the good life? One must know what culture is in order to judge Cultures. Philosophy can only begin with a horizon or a Culture. Should philosophy destroy those horizons by calling them into question through historical analysis (via the philosophy of history) it will destroy itself. Nietzsche is thus indicating that while most men need good harbors to provide them with homes, even those few born adventurers need good harbors from which to begin and to which they might, out of necessity, return from time to time.

Nietzsche continues by reminding us of the beginning of the essay. We began by considering herd animals. It is now clear that he meant for us to consider man as a herd animal. We have seen in the course of this consideration, of this "dangerous and exciting" voyage,

that a kind of degeneration of the soul is caused by modern cultivation. Nietzsche again lists the characteristics of that degeneration, reminding us of the similar lists he gave at the beginning of Chapter 5 and the end of Chapter 9.

We ourselves display the traces of those sufferings which, as a consequence of an excess of Historie, came over men of recent times, and precisely this treatise, shows, as I will not conceal, in the superfluity of its criticism, in the immaturity of its humanity (Menschlichkeit), in the frequent transition from irony to cynicism, from pride to skepticism, its modern character, the character of the weak personality.

Nietzsche has not, by his own admission, become as untimely as he would like. How, one wonders, can Nietzsche be sure that his own view isn't also the product of the very degeneration that he is trying to bring to light? What has guided Nietzsche across this infinite sea of skepticism? Nietzsche says it was no genius but the "inspiring power" of youth. Our age can produce no genius because it has no culture.

I trust in youth to have guided me correctly when now it forces me to protest against the historical education of the youth of modern men and when in protest I demand that above all men must learn to live and use Historie only in the service of the life they have learned to live.

What does Nietzsche mean by youth and what is the

distinction between youth's "inspiring power" and genius? How can Nietzsche, a decadent himself, have gained an insight into decadence? Here we must remind ourselves of what Nietzsche said concerning his own untimeliness. He is a "nursling of older ages," above all the Greeks. The Greeks are indeed the youth of world-history. It is looking back to them and asking how they were able to found a Culture that we might learn how to found one for ourselves. The Greeks, that is, Plato, Xenophon, Aristophanes, Thucydides, and Aristotle, can provide us with an untimely education. To study them in order to learn what culture is, rather than assuming we have culture, leads to the awakening of a natural instinct that is revulsed by modern education. Youth is revolted at the idea of being an epigone. Youth is naturally attracted to the old books, especially of those authors from Athens and Florence, which make the case that the good life is a universal and permanent possibility and thus foster the hope that one can still found empires, achieve eternal glory, and lead the good life in this world, whether it be primarily contemplative or political.

One must be young to understand this protest against modern cultivation and education, Nietzsche says. The older one is, the more one is a product of that education and has been thus sickened by the historical disease. And one of the most characteristic traits of that education is that it makes us blind to this disease. We have no knowledge of our lack of culture because modern education,

as Nietzsche demonstrated, makes self-knowledge impossible. Culture is born out of a recognized felt need that begins in knowledge of one's ignorance about the most important things. Youth still has an instinct or natural desire for culture because it begins with a consciousness, however inarticulate, of its ignorance and need together with a desire to experience things firsthand.

Nietzsche provides us with an example to make the meaning of his protest clearer. In the 18th century in Germany "a natural instinct for what one calls poetry" was awakened in a few young men. Before that time, he says, the Germans thought, wrote, and quarrelled about "poetry" "with words about words, words, words." This does not mean that the "word-makers" are not still with us but that perhaps there are a hundred more men who today know what poetry is. Perhaps a century later there will be a hundred more men who know what culture is.

Nietzsche's example of the rise of what is now called the "classical period" of German literature serves to illustrate the difference between having knowledge about poetry and being able to write poetry. Germany was for a long time dominated by the French in almost every way. France had obviously risen to great artistic heights. Some even referred to it as a new Athens. The German artists and writers did little more than copy the French until the middle of the 18th century. Then, beginning with Friedrich Klopstock and continuing with Lessing and

Herder, there was a fierce reaction against this travelling in borrowed manners and customs. They asserted that the German poets must strive to express what is original and unique, and lies at the heart of German life. Combined with this fierce attack on, and rejection of, adopted French conventions was the attempt to find a new source and guide for German poetry. This was found in two places: nature and the Greeks. A natural instinct was thus awakened. After Goethe and Schiller almost everything that comes before seems to be poor imitation. Goethe and Schiller were both heavily influenced by Rousseau (an untimely Frenchman) and the Greeks. Yet the success of German poetry did not go so far as to bring a German Culture into being. Nietzsche argued earlier that it failed because of the rise of Hegelian philosophy. Hegel's historicism makes the Greeks irrelevant. For if human beings are products of history, what can the Greeks teach us about human nature?

The founding of a German Culture depends first upon the destruction of Hegelian philosophy and the notion of cultivation it has inspired. It also depends upon their returning to those things which awakened that "natural instinct" in Goethe and Schiller--nature and the Greeks. Without the idea of nature we have no reason to look to the Greeks as teachers and models. Only if we believe they had permanently valid insights into the nature of things, can we look to them in order to learn what culture is.

The first step in founding a German Culture is the destruction of the modern notion of cultivation. It is only a kind of knowledge about cultivation, and quite a false and superficial knowledge at that. "It is false and superficial because it endures the contradiction between life and knowledge."

[W]hat is characteristic in the cultivation of truly-cultured peoples was not seen at all: that culture can only grow and blossom out of life; while with the Germans it is only tacked on like a paper flower or poured over like icing and must for that reason remain deceitful and unfruitful.

Our modern "knowledge about cultivation" fails to see that the unity of life and action is essential to culture. A man's knowledge and speech must agree with his deeds. This sort of agreement, or honesty, as Nietzsche earlier called it, is what marks the difference between the cultured man and the learned man. Honesty is a natural standard because we have a natural instinct for it. It is this same honesty that serves as the measure of the greatness of Hellenic culture. Education in the service of life is one that cultivates this instinct for unity and honesty. In contrast, modern education kills that instinct, leaving us with nothing more than a restless desire for innovation.

The aim of modern education is not the liberally-educated man but the scholar or scientist. He is a theoretical man, dispassionate and objective, and above

all learned. His "objectivity" gives him a strong democratic prejudice because he believes in the equality of all values. The democratic state provides for the education of such men and they in turn through their research become useful to that state. The result of this education, says Nietzsche, is not the "free man" of liberal education but the "historico-aesthetic-cultivated-Philistine." The modern intellectual, "the precocious newly wise chatter box on matters of state, church, and art," is the opposite of the liberally-educated man.

A liberal education is always an untimely education. Its aim is to produce the free man. He is free in the highest and most important sense--free to consider seriously the most important question: what is the good life? His education has freed him from the authoritative opinions of his age. This leaves him free to examine the fundamental human alternatives. In the Western tradition, these alternatives are represented most dramatically in the contest between ancient and modern philosophy. Modern historicism makes this kind of education impossible because it refuses to admit that ancient philosophy, which includes the medieval thinkers, represents a real, living alternative. Nietzsche quite clearly wishes to revive the battle between the ancients and the moderns. He is superior to modern men because he is not merely a decadent. Modernity culminates in decadence. Nietzsche is not merely a decadent because he is a nursling of the

Greeks. "Historie in the service of life" means Historie as a way to a liberal education, to untimeliness. It is to use ancient philosophy to examine modernity and in so doing to evaluate modernity's claim to superiority. This can only be done if one can suspend one's historicism, and therefore treat the ancients as possibly being right.

This modern historical education is "contrary to nature." One can feel this if one is "young enough." "[I]t is only felt by the instinct of youth because it still has the instinct of nature." The "instinct of nature" is destroyed by modern education, whereas a true liberal education is consistent with that instinct. Nietzsche's suggestion is that if we wish to recover the "instinct of nature", we must recover youth. Youth has an "unconscious resistance" to modern education which can be used to break modern education. Nietzsche would provide a new education for youth, one which would "light the way for its unconscious resistance with the clarity of concepts and turn it into a conscious, loudly articulate consciousness." A liberal education is thus an education which is in harmony with, and perhaps even cultivates, the "instinct of youth." Liberal education is the cultivation and not the annihilation of our natural instincts.

Nietzsche knows that his goal, a self-conscious articulate resistance towards modern education, will seem to most modern men a strange one. Yet it is this resistance that is the beginning of a truly liberal

education. It must be revolted at the utilitarian's view of education. What is the use of such an education? How does it help one earn a living and what contribution does such a man make to society? What is the vocation of a liberal man? Modern education attempts to combine liberal and vocational education. The result is the scholar or university professor. Nietzsche argues that this attempt has been an abject failure.

So, it is necessary to bring about a new kind of education--at least new to our time. This requires that the hold that the modern historical mode of cultivation has on today's youth be broken. How is this to be achieved? Nietzsche says that one must begin by destroying the timely belief in the necessity of historical cultivation. Should one require proof that we do indeed believe in the necessity of the historical mode of education, one need only look at the modern literature on education.

[T]he examiner will, with indignant astonishment, become aware how uniformly the whole intent of education is conceived in all the fluctuating proposals and vehemence of disagreement, how thoughtlessly the prevailing product, the "learned man" as he is understood at present, is accepted as the necessary and rational foundation of all further education.

The true liberal education does not aim to produce the "learned man" or scholar, but the cultured man. Modern thinking about education all turns within a horizon which

evidently equates culture with learning. For everyone seems to agree, says Nietzsche, that a cultured man must needs be learned in history.. The young man must begin with "knowledge about cultivation" rather than "knowledge of life." Life itself remains even further removed. "Knowledge about cultivation" is the means to becoming a "learned man." One thus studies the "development" of English literature, rather than individual authors with an eye to what each tells you about life. For the idea that one could learn all one needs to know about living from Swift, Shakespeare, Bacon, Hobbes, or Locke is now thought laughable. No man is considered "educated" unless he is familiar with every author from Chaucer to Atwood, and how the one "evolved" from the other. This is true in every aspect of education, not just English literature. One thus learns about English literature and its development by reading historical surveys and augmenting this perhaps by taking a quick gallop through the ages, superficially reading the "representative works of each genre." The same holds true for music, poetry, philosophy, painting and politics. The modern "educated man" tries to sample everything. The effect of this type of education, that is, historical cultivation, is that our natural instincts are deadened.

[H]is head is filled with an enormous number of concepts which are drawn from the highly mediated cognition of past times and peoples, not from the immediate looking-on life. His desire to

experience something himself and to feel a coherent living system of his own experiences grow within--such a desire is anaesthetized and as it were intoxicated, namely with the rank illusion that it is possible in a few years to summarize within oneself the highest and most remarkable experiences of ancient times and precisely the highest times.

Historical cultivation leads to a kind of imitation. It leads the artist or sculptor into the museum rather than into the workshop of a master. But what can one learn from museums, whether they be salons filled with paintings and sculptures or university courses whose subject is "the history of...?" One cannot learn the techniques and skills, let alone the wisdom, of past masters by taking a cursory amble through history. We should rather study with one of the masters. He alone can take us into "the sole workshop of the sole mistress, nature." Museum culture produces historians--men learned in the development of things. This learning is not in the service of life. For such men do not learn with an eye to making or creating. One cannot learn to govern by studying the history of political philosophy, although one might from studying Aristotle's Politics. Nietzsche is suggesting that it would take a lifetime of study to understand truly the works of even a few of the masters. And it is with an eye to action that one studies them. One rightly studies Aristotle to become wise in the ruling art and not to become learned in history. For such learnedness is of no use to the activity of governing, or of living insofar as it involves

governing oneself and others.

Having just suggested that education must lead us into the workshop of a master, Nietzsche now does exactly that. He uses the example of the "noble lie" from the Republic to show how contemporary education, like the "Platonic state," depends upon the belief in the aeterna veritas of its fundamental principles. Should those principles, in this case the idea of the necessity of historical cultivation, be shown to be transient, historical cultivation will fall.

Plato held it as necessary, that the first generation of his new society (in the perfect state) be educated [reared] with the help of a strong lie-in-need; the children should learn to believe, that they all once had lived dreaming under the earth for a long time, where they were kneaded and formed by the master-artisan of nature. It is impossible for them to rebel against the past! Impossible to oppose the work of the gods! It should be counted as an unbreakable natural-law; who was born as a philosopher, has gold in his body; who as guardian only silver; who as worker iron and bronze. As it is impossible to mix these metals, explains Plato, so is it to be impossible to ever turn round the caste-order and throw it into confusion; the belief in the aeterna veritas of this order is the foundation of this education and therewith of the new state.

The citizens of Socrates' best city in speech must believe in the aeterna veritas of their aristocratic political order. It is eternal because it is grounded in both nature and the divine. For in the best city the gods and nature are never visibly at odds. "[T]he belief in the aeterna veritas of this order is the foundation of the

new education and therewith of the new state." Nietzsche suggests that he too has a political order in mind with his new education. The destruction of the old view of education may also mean the destruction of the old state. But Nietzsche makes no explicit statement here concerning the best regime. He says that the example from the Republic is instructive because it shows us how to destroy the old order. The modern belief in the aeterna veritas of modern education will fail just as the belief in the aeterna veritas of the Republic's political order would have if the "lie-in-need" is opposed by a "truth-in-need." (If it is need that makes lying noble, one can reasonably infer that Plato's Socrates and Nietzsche might agree that the same holds true for telling the truth). This "truth-in-need" is that we moderns have no culture. And given modern education, that is, historical cultivation, we could never have culture. Nietzsche says that this is a simple, unpleasant, rude and just truth. He suggests that the destruction of the old order is just and thus that the old order is unjust.

Nietzsche's summary account of the noble lie is not an accurate one. He makes important changes saying that men are fashioned by nature when Socrates says it is "the earth, which is their mother" and that they have metal in their bodies where Socrates says they have them in their souls. Nietzsche nowhere mentions the oracle which says that "the city will be destroyed when an iron or bronze

man is its guardian." Finally, and most importantly, Nietzsche neglects to mention that Socrates says the city must not be made to depend upon the belief in the "noble lie." He convinces Glaucon that they must set down laws concerning the property and living arrangements of the citizens, especially the guardians and their auxiliaries. The omission of the oracle and the laws is important. The need for the oracle casts doubt on the eternality of the order. How can what is eternal be destroyed? The need for these particular laws casts doubt on the efficacy of both the noble lie and the oracle. Socrates' city would thus need more than just a "truth-in-need" to destroy it. These changes suggest that the destruction of the old order may not be as easy as Nietzsche seems to suggest.

Finally, is it not also possible that the "lie-in-need" is not so much of a lie after all? If one considers the lie in light of the allegory of the cave, a certain obvious, albeit metaphorical, reinterpretation suggests itself. For the cave allegory suggests that most men do indeed spend their lives in a kind of dream beneath the earth.

Every generation in the Republic must be raised on the "noble lie." The first generation of Nietzsche's new order must be raised on a "truth-in-need." Unlike in the Republic, succeeding generations will not. These firstlings will suffer because this is a bitter truth. As yet we have no Culture and our present kind of education

is not only incapable of producing one--it actively works against it. Our first generation must "educate itself with this truth, and that is itself against itself, to a new habit and nature, out of an old nature and habit." Education is understood as a process of self-overcoming. One must guard and preserve oneself from, and hence overcome, "the nature acquired by upbringing." We lack even the foundation of culture within us. The belief, that the old order can and must be overturned because it produces mere philistines, could provide a new foundation for education. Here one can again feel strongly the need to be educated. It is upon this new foundation that Nietzsche hopes to raise a new Culture.

Nietzsche hopes to implant the longing from a sense of what we need and lack. His psychology of the modern "educated man" or scholar serves this purpose. Modern man is mechanically divided into an inner and an outer self. He is sown with a variety of alien concepts like dragon's teeth, an allusion to the Phoenecian myth of Cadmus, which is the model for the "noble lie." But, the dragon's teeth grow and become men, whom Cadmus uses to found Thebes. Our concepts, derived from a variety of cultures, merely make war amongst themselves. The soul or inner self of modern man thus remains weak and divided, a chaos of different drives with no principles of order and no ruler. Culture depends on some ordering thing--a Cadmus of the soul who can found a city in the soul. Without this we

remain empty despite being "educated," suffering from "the sickness of words" and we are without trust in any feeling of our own that has not been stamped with words. For us words or speech is the standard. Nietzsche says this is a mark of our degeneration. We are theoretical and hence sick men. A healthy soul does not measure the instincts with reason because they are in harmony with each other.

Modern historical cultivation leaves us mechanically divided into an inside and an outside. We are filled with useless knowledge, which is thus nowhere to be seen as the motive force behind our actions. This is perfectly in keeping with modern philosophic understanding of human nature. Nietzsche here quotes Descartes' "cogito, ergo sum" as a telling description of modern man. We have the right to say we think therefore we are, but no right to say we live therefore we think. We are "thinking beings" but not "living beings." For us science and life are opposed because our science destroys the horizon upon which life depends. "First give me life, then I will also create for you a culture." Nietzsche says this will be the call of the individuals of our first generation. All life must begin, all education must be based upon a horizon. Our first generation will be known to each other by this call, by their longing and their active search to find or create a horizon. They form a community who share in common the knowledge of their own ignorance and lack of experience of the higher things. Their goal is life and their means is to criticize and destroy modern education.

Their saying no to modern education leads to their saying yes to the best education.

Only our own youth can give us life. Life is in this world and is not to be had from imitating foreign cultures. We cannot look to God or to other men. This formulation suggests that Nietzsche is talking about a quality that exists in the human soul. Youth describes a kind of natural state where we still feel the "instinct of nature." If we unchain youth, Nietzsche says, we will unchain life along with it. Life is not dead but only lies concealed and dormant in a prison within us. The liberation of youth is thus a necessary condition for the liberation of life and restoration to health. The bonds that enchain youth are formed by the modern view of education and its cultural ideal of the learned man or scholar. Once one begins to see how profoundly questionable the modern view of education is, one has already achieved a kind of liberation. One can again take seriously the question: what is the good life?

Nietzsche's new education involves more than just an untimely attack on modern education, because the problem is not solved with the liberation of life. "[I]t is sick this unfettered life, and must be healed." He says it suffers from many ills but mentions only two. Here we are principally concerned with the "historical disease." "The excess of Historie has attacked the plastic strength of life; it no longer understands how to avail itself of the past as hearty nourishment." It is not historicism, i.e.,

the historical disease, that forms the chains. They are formed by the modern idea of cultivation. And the destruction of this idea of cultivation is necessary but not sufficient to destroy historicism.

Nietzsche thus indicates that the liberation of youth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for healing life. Once liberated, youth knows three things. Youth has the "clairvoyant gift of nature." It thus knows that historicism is a disease and that a "paradise of health" has been lost. "This same youth guesses with the curative instinct of that same nature how that paradise is to be regained." It knows that the antidotes to historicism are the unhistorical and the superhistorical. This explains how Nietzsche recognized the disease and knew its cures. He had found a way to educate himself that leadsto the liberation he has described. We are again reminded of his being a "nursling of older ages, especially the Greeks."

At this point Nietzsche explicitly calls our attention to the beginning of the essay. He does this to remind us of his earlier discussion of a paradise. In Chapter One Nietzsche said that when one looks upon a herd of grazing animals or a child, one is moved as if one remembers a lost paradise. Nietzsche now seems to suggest that it is this very experience, this longing for the kind of wholeness and hence happiness that is exhibited in these simple lives which can provide the occasion and direction for reflecting upon life itself. It is one of our most

fundamental longings to regain this paradise. We cannot rely on God--on there being a heavenly paradise. Instead we must found a culture. For it is only in a Culture that men can again live with a kind of unity to his experience for which he by nature, instinctively, longs.

Nietzsche goes on to define once more the unhistorical and superhistorical, and to recapitulate his earlier discussion of the tension between life and science. Since science sees only becoming, it cannot abide by the illusions of permanence created by the superhistorical, illusions necessary for life.

The unhistorical is here defined as "the art and the strength of being able to forget and enclose oneself within a limited horizon." This is the first time Nietzsche has defined the unhistorical. In Chapter One he said that animals are "wholly unhistorical and live within a pointlike horizon." Man also lives and experiences things unhistorically at times. But he becomes human only because he "shrinks the unhistorical element" and fashions history out of the things that have happened. He constructs an interpretation of the past, a history. Historie is both creative and analytic. Historie is only possible if one has a unified set of principles which provide a consistent and coherent basis for selection and interpretation. These principles form our horizon. They are superhistorical in the eyes of those who live within that horizon. They constitute our fundamental and most strongly held beliefs, such as our ideas of right and

wrong, good and evil, noble and base, beautiful and ugly. The superhistorical is what allows man to live unhistorically. Man cannot learn to forget yet action requires forgetting. What causes man to forget? Nietzsche says that it is love. The objects of human love are determined by nature. All the particular manifestations of this love have the status of instincts. These instincts are rooted in our inner nature. That inner nature is formed by our horizon. The love we feel towards that horizon is thus inseparable from self-love. This love is also a cause for wonder. "[H]e wonders that his memory so tirelessly turns in a circle and is yet too weak and tired to make a single leap out of this circle." The strength to forget is thus as strong as the strength of our love or passion. The superhistorical refers to "the powers which guide the eye away from becoming and towards that which gives being-there an eternal character of the same meaning, toward art and religion." In Chapter One Nietzsche referred to the superhistorical not as powers but as a standpoint and a kind of man. The earlier discussion was about the superhistorical in regards to man as a "knowing being." This new notion of the superhistorical is in regards to man as a "living being." He rejected the earlier notion of the superhistorical because it undermined the basis for action. By showing that our passions are rooted in history, he destroys the basis for all passion--the belief

in something eternal. The superhistorical for man as a "knowing being" is fundamentally nihilistic. Nietzsche is trying to show how it need not be nihilistic for man as a "living being."

In Chapter One Nietzsche said that a man must be either "capable of drawing a horizon around [himself]" or "unselfish enough to enclose [his] vision within another's horizon." Nihilism is the result of the man who is incapable of drawing a horizon around himself rising to the superhistorical standpoint. Such a standpoint is only for a few. Only a few have the power to create horizons. The superhistorical standpoint is nihilistic for most because it is the result of scientific Historie. Scientific Historie is grounded in the faith that there is an order to history which, once understood, can take the place traditionally held by metaphysics. This philosophy of history would then provide us with a permanent, superhistorical set of principles to guide our lives. Nietzsche shows, in Chapters 5-9, that the argument for an order to history is a dubious one. The belief in historical progress is itself a product of history. The superhistorical is rightly understood from the perspective of art rather than science.

Science looks upon the unhistorical and the superhistorical as poisons. Nietzsche argues that it is science itself which has given rise to the historical disease, and it is that which is poisoning contemporary man. He intends to completely revalue science and the

scientific understanding of Historie.

Science--for it is science which would speak of poisons--sees in that strength, in those powers, hostile powers and strengths: for it only takes the consideration of things to be the correct one, that is the scientific consideration, which everywhere sees what has come to be, the historical and nowhere that which is (Seiendes), the eternal.

Scientific Historie always attempts to explain what is in terms of how it came to be. Art and religion explain what is in terms of what is always, whether that be nature or the divine. Scientific Historie debunks the explanations that refer to nature or the divine by showing how beliefs about both nature and the divine have changed through time and are thus products of history. Nietzsche does not draw a distinction between ancient and modern science, which seems to suggest that he thinks the problem is rooted more deeply in the tradition than the distinction between ancients and moderns. He leaves no room for a science that could look at both the things that come to be and the things that are always because he agrees with the superhistorical or historicist insight that there are no permanent or superhistorical things. One is left to ponder over the status of the "superhistorical insight" itself.

The contest between the nihilistic power of science and the eternalizing powers of art and religion must be decided in favor of life. This means that science must be ruled by a power higher than itself and not that science

must be destroyed or ignored. It is more a question of who are the scientists than one of choosing between science and art or religion. This higher power must decide who are the ones "capable of drawing a horizon around themselves." The same ones will be both the scientists and the founders. The historicist insight opens up a new world of freedom for these men. Instead of science leading to nihilism, it leads, for the few, to a whole new realm of possibilities. For they now know they need not look to history to set the bounds of their creations. For the first time man can create his horizon with a full awareness that it is only a horizon.

Nietzsche calls this higher ruling power a "hygiene of life." Hygiene is the knowledge of health, including the health of the soul. Science is to thus be ruled by a particular kind of knowledge and not by art or religion. Nietzsche means that science, as well as the eternalizing powers of art and religion, is to be ruled by philosophy. The philosopher is the physician of culture. And culture is nothing other than the health and perfection of the human soul. It is Nietzsche's intention to re-establish political philosophy as the queen of the sciences.

Science must not be allowed to rule itself. It has the power to undermine the foundation upon which all political community depends--"the belief in the enduring and eternal." A Culture or political community cannot survive without that belief.

As in an earthquake cities collapse and become deserted and man erects his house on volcanic ground only hastily and trembling with fear, so life itself collapses into itself and becomes feeble and discouraged when the concept-quake which science provokes takes from man the foundation of his security and calm, the belief in the enduring and eternal.

Science, if it is allowed to rule itself, will not only destroy political life--it will also destroy itself. For science is dependent upon politics for its ends. Modern science is apparently devoted to the mastery of nature, i.e., to the relief of man's estate. We wish to impose an order on things and thereby control them. This order is not to be discovered in nature. It comes instead from politics because it is politics which makes the authoritative statement about what the good is for man.

In order to restore philosophy to its rightful position as queen of the sciences, we must destroy the old order in which science has established itself as the sole ruler. Nietzsche sees here "the mission of youth."

It is their mission to shake the concepts of "health" and "cultivation" the present has, and to beget ridicule and hatred against such hybrid concept-monsters.

How is this first generation to go about doing this? Nietzsche himself has shown the way in his essay. The central part of the essay is an example of critical Historie. It analyzes and hence "shakes" our notions of "health" and "cultivation." His account may well beget

hatred against these concepts.

One cannot overlook the political and religious overtones of the idea of youth's mission. Nietzsche refers to this youth as "that first generation of fighters and dragon-slayers."⁵⁹ This is another reference to the Greek myth of Cadmus. Upon slaying the dragon that had killed his men, he was instructed to sow the dragon's teeth. From these teeth grew the earth-born men or Spartoi. Cadmus set them to fighting and when only five were left banded them together and founded a city. We are "sown with concepts as with dragon's teeth." In Chapters Five through Nine Nietzsche spoke of five effects of the excess of *Historie*. One can now see that each of these effects give rise to one of these concept-monsters. The example of Cadmus suggests that we must find some way to put these to use. We must turn each one of those defects towards founding a new Culture by using them to annihilate the timely notions of "cultivation" and "health."

This generation will take untimeliness as their standard of health. Untimeliness is overcoming one's times in oneself. The untimely men "can use no concept, no party-word from the present store of word- and concept-coinage to represent [their] own being." They are convinced by an ever-growing sense of power and life. This generation has a task and a purpose. It is to found a Culture. The previous generation were mere epigoni. They had grown weak because of an excess of Historie. Health, an ever-growing sense of power, depends upon one's

having a goal or purpose. That feeling of power increases as one moves closer to that goal. The epigoni had lost all sense of purpose because of the destruction of their horizon by scientific Historie. Nietzsche restores this sense of purpose by providing youth with a goal--the founding of a Culture. It is a monumental task.

The essay's conclusion is written in an oracular and allusive fashion. Nietzsche says that his audience is really two audiences--the doubters and the hopeful ones. Only the latter can understand what he has to say here. He then speaks to the company of hopeful ones by presenting a parable. He concludes the essay with an explanation of the parable. One cannot help but think of the Christian overtones in both Nietzsche's giving youth a mission, of youth's virtue being hope, and of Nietzsche's explaining the course of their future by way of a parable. This suggests that while Nietzsche speaks openly of a return to the Greeks, this return somehow includes Christianity.

Nietzsche begins this final section by drawing a distinction between those who are filled with a new hope for the future and those who have only doubts. The hopeful ones "will understand all these generalities intimately and will translate them with their own experience into a personal teaching for themselves." What are these generalities? Nietzsche is referring primarily to "an active struggling...power" and "an ever

higher feeling of life." These hopeful ones know from experience "that attacks, demands, drives-to-life, [and] passions lay boxed up and pressed together in these generalities." The excess of Historie has made the present generation into objective, i.e., dispassionate, men. They take their bearings from the historical process and not from their own natures because those natures are lifeless. They were made lifeless by the belief that they have no nature-- they are "products of history."

Nietzsche concludes his discussion of those who feel only doubt about the future on a note of irony. "I refer these doubters to time, which brings everything to light." This is ironic because it is on the basis of their interpretation of time or the historical process that they believe we have reached the end of history. Nietzsche intends to persuade us that we need not consider our time the end of history and that a great danger lies in our believing it so.

For those who refuse to believe that our time constitutes the end and culmination of world-history, who have faith in their own power to create a future for themselves, Nietzsche recounts a parable. He describes the parable as a history of the course and progress of the cure to historicism. At the end of this history is a "paradise of health." For they will have ceased being such aggregates because they will have "unlearned much" and even lost the desire to learn what the "learned" men of today think are the important things. They will desire

to know what the important things are. Such men will be products of a completely different education--a liberal education. It is liberal education that culminates in the freedom from the bonds of conventional opinion and turns its recipient towards seeking knowledge of the good. This knowledge begins with self-knowledge. Only then can one begin to judge the authoritative opinion about the good. One begins, as Nietzsche indicates, by asking oneself what are the human necessities. What are the needs man has by virtue of his being human? This starting point leads to the question of political philosophy--what is human nature? When man can again begin to seriously ask that question, he will have recovered a "paradise of health," and culture becomes a real possibility. He will once again be able to "engage in Historie anew, and to serve the past in that three-fold sense." "Do you not laugh in your hearts about this, you hopeful ones?"

One cannot help but think of Socrates when Nietzsche speaks of an education that culminates in ignorance. The image of Socrates looms even larger in Nietzsche's parable. But Nietzsche takes care to obscure that image by naming Heraclitus and not Socrates in connection the Delphic oracle.

And how do we come to that goal? you will ask. The Delphic god calls his motto to you already at the beginning of a journey to that goal: "Know yourself." It is a difficult motto: for that god "does not reveal and does not conceal, but only indicates," as Heraclitus has

said. Of what does he hint at to you?

There were centuries in which the Greeks found themselves in a danger similar to the one we find ourselves in today, namely of being swamped by the strange and past, of perishing on Historie. Never did they live in proud isolation: their "cultivation" was for a much longer time a chaos of foreign Semitic, Babylonian, Lydian, [and] Egyptian forms and concepts and their religion truly a struggle of all the gods of the Orient: perhaps similar to present German "cultivation" and religion, itself a struggling chaos of all foreign countries, of all preceding times. And nevertheless the Hellenic Culture became no mere aggregate, thanks to its Appollinion motto. The Greeks gradually learned to organize the chaos in themselves, that means to reflect back upon their real needs and let their seeming needs die out. Thus they again took possession of themselves; they did not long remain the overloaded heirs and epigoni of the whole Orient; they became, through the practical interpretation of that motto, after a difficult struggle with themselves, the happiest enrichers and increasers of that inherited treasure and firstcomers and models of all coming cultured peoples.

This is a parable for every "individual" among us, which is not to say everyone or even most of us. He must learn to organize the chaos in himself and thus create a cosmos in his own soul. Nietzsche indicates that there is a natural order to the human soul, but that order must be brought about through a combination of knowledge and will. Most men are incapable of this because the strength of their reason and will is lacking. The "individual" must look to his own character and learn what are his own needs. He rejects the opinions of his age in favor of knowledge of his self. Such opinions are always only "second hand speech, second hand learning and imitation." It is this distinction between opinion and knowledge that

is the basis of culture. Our modern concept of culture is derived from the Romans. Nietzsche says that the Romans lived in the shadow of the Greeks. For them culture was never more than decoration and learned imitation. The same held true for the Germans, who took culture to be imitating the French. We must learn to see the distinction between the Roman and the Greek views of culture. The Greeks understood what culture is--"a new and improved physis." Culture is not the decoration and ornamentation of life but the growth, health, strength, and power of life. It results in an ever growing "unanimity of life, thinking, appearance and willing". Self-knowledge organizes all activity around the fulfillment of needs. Need imposes an order on both the soul and our activity, an order which effects a unity between thought and action.

The goal of self-reflection is knowledge about human necessity. Such reflection necessarily involves the rejection of learned opinion about those necessities. It means the rejection of a canon of learning which supposedly defines a cultivated man. One cannot look to history or society for an account of one's needs, which is not to say that one can't look to history for a teacher about how one can come to know himself. Nietzsche indicates that we can find such teachers among the Greeks.

Thus he learns from his own experience that it was through higher strength of moral (Sittlichen) nature that the Greeks succeeded in conquering all other Cultures, and that every increase in truthfulness must also be a preparatory advancement of true cultivation: even if this truthfulness occasionally and seriously harms the respect in which "learned cultivation" stands, even if it is to help an entire decorative culture to fall.

The experience of long and profound reflection on one's own needs, the desire for the truth about those needs, allows one to see clearly that it is the desire for justice, i.e., strength, that is the driving force behind culture. In Chapter Six Nietzsche argued that it is justice that forms the core of the drive for truth and that justice means strength. The Greeks conquered all other cultures because of their strong moral natures, which is to say their will to be just. They wanted above all justice for themselves, to be rightly the most powerful men on earth.

Nietzsche suggests that there is a vital connection between culture and philosophy. Philosophy is the desire for wisdom or knowledge about the most important things, i.e., our needs, not for its own sake but for the sake of justice. Philosophy is thus the activity that leads to culture. When Nietzsche says we must return to the Greeks, he means that we must take the Greek philosophers as our teachers. In the essay he mentions or makes reference to Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle. When he talks about the importance of the

Delphic oracle, it is not the tragic interpretation of the oracle that emerges from the poets like Sophocles but the philosophic one that comes from Heraclitus. The Greek philosophers did two things that make them unique: they discovered nature and hence philosophy; then they discovered political philosophy.

FOOTNOTES

- 1
Nietzsche, Friedrich Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, trans. (New York:Random House 1967) p. 3.
- 2
Ibid., p. 9.
- 3
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- 4
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- 6
Burckhardt, J. The Letters of Jacob Burckhardt, selected, edited and translated by Alexander Dru, (London:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), pp. 158-9.
- 7
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- 8
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- 9
Dannhauser, W. Nietzsche's View of Socrates, (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 142.
- 10
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- 11
Calvin Rand "Two Meanings of Historicism in the Writings of Dilthey, Troeltsch and Mannheim", Journal of the History of Ideas, 25 (1964):505.

12

Mandelbaum, M. "Historicism," p. 23.

13

Mannheim, K. Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. (London:Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 104.

14

Ibid.

15

Ibid., p. 96.

16

Ibid.

17

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18

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19

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20

Meinecke, Historicism, p. lvii.

21

Ibid.

22

Lee, D.W. and Beck, R.N. "The Meaning of Historicism", American Historical Review, 59(1953-4):577.

23

Rand, "Two Meanings," pp. 515-6.

24

Brecht, A. Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 186.

25

Rosen, S. Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1969), p. 56.

26

Dictionary of Philosophy, Dagobert Runes, ed., (New Jersey:Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1962), p. 127.

- 27
Mandelbaum, "Historicism", p. 24.
- 28
Political Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo Strauss, H. Gilden, ed. (Indiannapolis:Bobbs-Merrill, 1975), p. 82.
- 29
Nietzsche, F. Ecce Homo, p. 126.
- 30
Idem, Complete Works, Vol. 3, preface.
- 31
Idem, On The Use and Disadvantage of Historie for Life, P. Preuss, trans. (Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing, 1980), p. 34.
- 32
Idem, Complete Works, Vol. 3, preface.
- 33
Idem, Untimely Meditations, R.J. Hollingdale, trans. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1983) p. 199.
- 34
Idem, Complete Works, Vol. 6, p. 12.
- 35
Idem, Werke in drei Banden, Karl Schlecta, ed. (Munich:Carl Hanser Verlag, 1954-56), Vol. I, p. 741.
- 36
Idem, Complete Works, Vol. 7, p. 1.
- 37
Idem, Daybreak, R.J. Hollingdale, trans. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 5.
- 38
Idem, The Gay Science, Walter Kaufmann, trans. (New York:Vintage Books, 1974), p. 381.
- 39
Ibid.
- 40
Idem, Beyond Good and Evil, Walter Kaufmann, trans. (New York:Vintage Books, 1967), No. 30. Compare No. 205.
- 41
Nietzsche, F. Ecce Homo, "Why I Write Such Excellent Books."

42

Ibid.

43

Ibid. On the question of Nietzsche's esotericism one should consult Nietzsche's lecture notes on rhetoric and on the Platonic dialogues, the whole of the second chapter of Beyond Good and Evil and the following chapters from Thus Spoke Zarathustra: "Of Reading and Writing" and "The Ugliest Man." On the phenomenon of esoteric writing see Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe:The Free Press, 1952).

44

Nietzsche, F. Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, Christopher Middleton, ed. and trans. (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 304-5.

45

I have used the German Historie wherever Nietzsche does and the English history for Geschic throughout my commentary. On the distinction between the two see Kaufmann's Nietzsche, p. 141 Footnote 18, George Grant Time as History (Toronto:Hunter Rose, 1969), p. 3-4 and Leo Strauss What is Political Philosophy? (New York:The Free Press, 1959), p. 60. The translations of Nietzsche's essay are my own.

46

Jean Jacques Rousseau, The First and Second Discourses, ed. Roger D. Masters, Trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters (New York:St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 39.

47

Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller, Der Briefwechsel Zwischen Schiller und Goethe (Munich:Emil Vollmer Verlag, 1978), pp. 564-5. Consider Leo Strauss, "Natural Right and the Historical Approach," in Political Philosophy:Six Essays by Leo Strauss, ed. Hilail Gilden (Indianapolis:Bobbs Merrill, 1975), p. 131.

48

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49

Rousseau, The First Discourse, p. 33.

50

Plato, Apology of Socrates, Ed. and Trans. Thomas G. West (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 39e - 40a.

51

For a better understanding of Nietzsche's idea of untimeliness one ought to consider the following: Untimely Meditations, pp. 55, 127-130, 198; The Gay Science, No. 380; Twilight of the Idols, "The Skirmishes of an Untimely Man"; The Case of Wagner, Preface; Beyond Good and Evil, No. 212. Compare Rousseau's First Discourse, pp. 33, 52-3.

52

Compare Rousseau's Second Discourse p. 103. One cannot help but hear Socratic overtones in Nietzsche's profession of ignorance about his own age.

53

Compare Nietzsche's Zarathustra, "The Voluntary Beggar."

54

Nietzsche takes this from Aristotle's Metaphysics, IV.5, 1010a13. Upon comparing the two one finds Nietzsche seems to be using the same evidence to make the opposite point from Aristotle. The alternative is that Nietzsche agrees with Aristotle which suggests that Historie, upon closer examination, does not show that everything is in flux.

55cf. Schopenhauer as Educator, pp. 127-129.

56

See George Morgan, What Nietzsche Means (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1941), Chapter 2.

57

Compare The Birth of Tragedy, "Preface" (6).

58

Compare Gay Science, No. 343.

59

This is how Goethe describes Schiller. Nietzsche quotes this description in On The Future of Our Educational Institutions, pp. 11-12. Compare his letter to Gersdorf in Selected Letters, p. 82.

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